The Hindu – Important News Articles & Editorial
Today’s coverage: the AERB on private nuclear entry, the MHA’s new visa rule for exempted migrants, NPCI defending the UPI merchant charge, the Supreme Court on internet access for children, compressed biogas blending, and an editorial on India’s middle-power moment.
‘Private involvement in nuclear sector won’t dilute safety’
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) Chairperson A.K. Balasubrahmanian has said that private entry into India’s nuclear energy sector will not compromise safety. He added that the sector is being opened at the right time, given the country’s growing power demand.
Key Facts
- SHANTI Act, 2025: the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act opens the sensitive nuclear sector to private players.
- Target: India aims for 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047.
- Regulator: the AERB oversees nuclear and radiation safety.
AERB’s Position
- Enabling environment: the AERB will facilitate private participation.
- No dilution: regulatory and safety requirements will not be relaxed.
- Timing: rising energy needs justify opening the sector now.
| Aspect | Before (Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and CLNDA, 2010) | SHANTI Act, 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Who can build and run plants | Only government companies such as NPCIL | Private players allowed under licence |
| Regulator | AERB, set up in 1983 by executive order under the 1962 Act | AERB given statutory status and made accountable to Parliament |
| Liability | Operator liability with a right of recourse against suppliers | Operator liability capped by plant capacity; supplier liability removed |
| Strategic activities | Government | Enrichment, reprocessing and weapons-related work stay with the government |
Static Dimensions
- SHANTI Act, 2025: received Presidential assent on 20 December 2025; repeals and replaces the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 with a single law.
- AERB: constituted in 1983 under Section 27 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962; now a statutory regulator.
- Three-stage programme: pressurised heavy water reactors, then fast breeder reactors, then thorium-based reactors.
- Nuclear Energy Mission (Budget 2025-26): ₹20,000 crore for research on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), with at least five indigenous SMRs targeted by 2033.
- International: India ratified the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 2016; civilian facilities are under IAEA safeguards.
Challenges
- Safety culture: profit motives may create pressure to trade safety for cost.
- Liability: clear accountability is needed in case of an accident.
- Regulatory capacity: the AERB must expand its staff and oversight to handle more operators.
- Waste management: long-term disposal of radioactive waste remains sensitive.
- Public trust: local communities need reassurance on safety and rehabilitation.
Way Forward
- Keep the regulator independent, well-resourced and technically strong.
- Enforce strict licensing, inspections and transparent safety audits.
- Define liability and insurance rules clearly.
- Build a skilled nuclear workforce and strengthen emergency preparedness.
- Engage local communities through open public communication.
India Implications
- Energy security: nuclear power is a firm, low-carbon source for base-load demand.
- Climate goals: it supports the shift away from fossil fuels.
- Investment: private capital and technology can speed up capacity addition.
Himachal angle: Himachal has seen the same debate with privately built hydropower in Kinnaur, Chamba and Kullu – fast capacity addition on one side, slope stability, downstream safety and local consent on the other. The lesson carries over: an independent, well-staffed regulator matters more than who owns the plant. The AERB’s remit also covers radiation facilities such as radiotherapy and X-ray units in the State’s hospitals.
Assertion (A): Nuclear energy can contribute to India’s energy security and climate change mitigation objectives.
Reason (R): Nuclear power plants can generate large amounts of electricity with relatively low direct carbon dioxide emissions during operation.
Select the correct answer using the code given below:
- (a) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.
- (b) Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A.
- (c) A is true, but R is false.
- (d) A is false, but R is true.
Click to reveal answer
“Private participation in India’s nuclear energy sector can accelerate capacity expansion, but nuclear safety must remain non-negotiable.” Critically examine. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
Visa mandatory for migrants from six non-Muslim communities: MHA
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) notified the Immigration and Foreigners (Exemption) (Amendment) Order, 2026 on 4 November. It makes an “appropriate visa” mandatory for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered India on or before 31 December 2024 without valid documents, or whose documents have expired, if they wish to continue staying in India. Their exemption from prosecution for lacking a passport or visa is retained.
Key Facts
- 2025 Order: the Immigration and Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 2025, issued on 2 September 2025 under the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, consolidated earlier notifications that had exempted the six minority communities from penal provisions of passport and foreigners laws.
- CAA, 2019: the Citizenship (Amendment) Act fast-tracked citizenship for the same six communities from the three countries, but only for those who entered India before 31 December 2014.
- Aim of the amendment: it aligns the exempted categories with the CAA and reorganises several other exemption categories.
- Visa Manual: now formally defined as the manual issued by the Central government containing instructions on visas, immigration and related matters.
Key Provisions of the Amendment
- Visa requirement: covered migrants from the six communities must obtain an appropriate visa for continued stay, though they remain protected from prosecution.
- Neighbouring countries: Indian citizens travelling to Nepal or Bhutan, and Nepali and Bhutanese citizens entering or leaving India, must now produce identity documents specified in the Visa Manual.
- Sri Lankan Tamil refugees: registered refugees who took shelter in India up to 9 January 2015 continue to be exempt from penalties if found without passports, travel documents or visas.
- Tibetan refugees: those who entered after 1959 with the relevant Entry Permit or Special Entry Permit issued by the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu stay exempt from visa and passport requirements, but must register with the Registration Officer and obtain a Certificate of Registration.
- New exemptions: armed forces personnel travelling on duty, their accompanying families on government transport, and foreign military personnel on warships or government vessels under repair in India.
- Long-term residents: groups facing difficulty renewing foreign passports – some Pakistani nationals who entered before 31 December 2009 intending to settle permanently, certain Partition-era migrants who returned from Pakistan and settled in Kerala, and persons of Indian origin who later took Malaysian or Singaporean citizenship. They too must obtain an appropriate visa.
| Aspect | CAA, 2019 | Exemption Order (as amended, 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Purpose | Fast-track citizenship | Protection from prosecution; stay on an appropriate visa |
| Entry cut-off | 31 December 2014 | 31 December 2024 |
| Communities | Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, Christians | Same six communities |
| Countries | Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan | Same three countries |
| Group | Condition | Position now |
|---|---|---|
| Sri Lankan Tamil refugees | Registered; sheltered in India up to 9 January 2015 | Exempt from penalties for lacking passport or visa |
| Tibetan refugees | Entered after 1959 with an Entry Permit or Special Entry Permit | Exempt from visa and passport rules; must register and hold a Certificate of Registration |
| Nepal and Bhutan travel | Indians going there; Nepali and Bhutanese citizens entering or leaving India | Must carry identity documents listed in the Visa Manual |
| Long-term residents | Unable to renew foreign passports | Covered, but must obtain an appropriate visa |
Static Dimensions
- Citizenship: Articles 5–11 of the Constitution; Article 11 empowers Parliament to regulate citizenship; Citizenship Act, 1955 (amended in 2019).
- Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025: in force from 1 September 2025; replaced the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act, 2000.
- Refugee policy: India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol and handles refugees through administrative policy.
- Rights of non-citizens: Articles 14 and 21 apply to all persons, including foreigners (NHRC v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 1996).
- Open borders: India–Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950); India–Bhutan Friendship Treaty (1949, revised in 2007).
Challenges
- Cut-off mismatch: the Order covers entry up to 31 December 2024, but the CAA cut-off is 31 December 2014. Those who arrived between 2015 and 2024 get protection but no clear route to citizenship.
- Documentation burden: many persecuted migrants lack records, so obtaining visas may be difficult and costly.
- Religion-based classification: excluding Muslim communities such as Ahmadiyyas and Shias, who also report persecution in these countries, draws criticism on constitutional grounds, particularly Article 14.
- Uneven treatment: different categories of refugees and migrants receive different entitlements, which can cause confusion.
- Open borders: new identity rules may inconvenience people who have long crossed freely to Nepal and Bhutan for work and family.
Way Forward
- A simple, time-bound and low-cost visa process, with relaxed documentary proof for those fleeing persecution.
- Clarify the path from long-term visa to citizenship for those who arrived after 2014.
- Awareness drives and help desks for affected communities.
- Consider a uniform, transparent refugee policy or law, consistent with constitutional values and humanitarian commitments.
- Phase in identity rules for the Nepal and Bhutan borders with adequate public notice.
India Implications
- Regularisation: migrants move from a protected but undocumented status to a documented one.
- Administrative clarity: reorganised categories and the Visa Manual definition give immigration authorities a single reference point.
- Border management: identity checks for travel involving Nepal and Bhutan tighten oversight of the open-border arrangements.
- Humanitarian balance: continued protection for Sri Lankan Tamil and Tibetan refugees preserves long-standing commitments.
Himachal angle: Himachal hosts the Central Tibetan Administration at Dharamshala and several Tibetan settlements, so the registration requirement for Tibetan refugees applies directly to many residents. The State’s apple orchards, hydro projects and construction sites also rely on seasonal workers from Nepal, who will now need to carry the identity documents listed in the Visa Manual.
Which of the following would be the most appropriate approach to address the challenges associated with the 2026 amendment to the Immigration and Foreigners (Exemption) Order?
- (a) Abolishing all immigration documentation requirements
- (b) Providing accessible visa procedures, transparent eligibility criteria and a clear framework for long-term migrants
- (c) Automatically granting citizenship to every undocumented migrant
- (d) Suspending all cross-border movement with neighbouring countries
Click to reveal answer
What are the major challenges faced by refugees and undocumented migrants in accessing basic rights and administrative services in India? (10 Marks, 150 Words)
Merchant charge has been imposed to save UPI ecosystem, NPCI tells SC
In a 100-page affidavit filed in the Supreme Court, the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) defended the new Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) of up to 0.4% on Person-to-Merchant (P2M) UPI transactions above ₹2,000, introduced through a September notification. It said “zero MDR” for all UPI transactions is no longer sustainable, as the running costs would burden the public exchequer.
Key Facts
- Scale of UPI: in August 2026, UPI processed 24.51 billion transactions worth about ₹29.82 lakh crore – its highest-ever monthly volume, about 791 million transactions a day.
- FY 2025-26: about 241.62 billion transactions worth about ₹314 lakh crore.
- Zero MDR policy: since 2021-22, the government has covered the cost of zero MDR through incentive schemes, which became a heavy financial strain.
- Legal challenge: petitioners argue that such a charge needs a new law, not just a notification.
NPCI’s Position
- P2P free: person-to-person transfers, about 70% of total UPI value, stay free irrespective of amount. No transaction or platform fee is permissible for individuals.
- Small merchant payments free: P2M payments up to ₹2,000 remain free of MDR, shielding everyday low-value payments.
- Limited coverage: MDR applies to only about 4% of merchant transactions; about 96% of P2M transactions are unaffected.
- Not a tax: MDR is a cost-recovery charge collected by system participants and distributed among them – not a tax, cess, fee or levy imposed under any delegated legislative power.
- System provider’s liberty: NPCI can determine MDR for the payment system it operates.
- Consensus: the UPI Steering Committee, which includes third-party app providers, endorsed the framework.
| Transaction type | Charge |
|---|---|
| Person-to-person (P2P), any amount | Free – no transaction or platform fee for individuals |
| Person-to-merchant (P2M) up to ₹2,000 | Zero MDR |
| P2M above ₹2,000 | MDR of up to 0.4% |
| Share of P2M transactions affected | About 4% (96% unaffected) |
| Period | Transactions | Value |
|---|---|---|
| August 2026 (record month) | 24.51 billion (about 791 million a day) | About ₹29.82 lakh crore |
| FY 2025-26 | About 241.62 billion | About ₹314 lakh crore |
Static Dimensions
- NPCI: set up in 2008 by the RBI and the Indian Banks’ Association under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007; a not-for-profit company that runs UPI, RuPay, IMPS and other retail payment systems.
- UPI: launched in 2016; the RBI regulates payment systems under the PSS Act, 2007.
- MDR: the fee a merchant pays for accepting digital payments, shared among the acquiring bank, the issuing bank, the payment app and the network.
- Zero-MDR law: Section 10A of the PSS Act, 2007 (inserted in 2019) bars banks and system providers from charging for prescribed electronic payment modes such as UPI and RuPay debit cards; zero MDR on these took effect from January 2020.
Challenges
- Legality: whether a notification is enough, or a statute is needed, is the key question before the court.
- Pass-through: merchants may raise prices or add surcharges to recover MDR.
- Small businesses: merchants with higher-value sales may shift to cash or other modes.
- Competition: cards and wallets may gain ground if UPI loses its zero-cost edge.
- Transparency: the cost basis and how MDR is shared among banks, apps and others need clarity.
- Adoption risk: any erosion of the free-UPI perception could slow growth.
Way Forward
- Clear, transparent cost-sharing among participants, with public disclosure of the cost basis.
- Keep the ₹2,000 threshold and P2P exemption firmly in place, with periodic review.
- Prevent merchants from imposing additional surcharges on customers.
- Consider statutory or regulatory backing to remove legal uncertainty.
- Protect small merchants through targeted support and low-cost options.
- Invest the proceeds in security, fraud prevention and system resilience.
India Implications
- Sustainability: rising volumes demand greater investment in security, resilience and infrastructure.
- Fiscal burden: the charge reduces dependence on government subsidies.
- Financial inclusion: keeping P2P and small payments free protects mass adoption.
- Regulatory precedent: the case will clarify how far payment system operators can set charges without legislation.
Himachal angle: Himachal’s tourism economy – hotels, homestays, taxi operators and adventure-sports businesses – handles many UPI payments above ₹2,000, so this is where surcharges or a drift back to cash are most likely. Everyday purchases at small shops and payments between individuals stay free.
What does Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) refer to in the digital payment ecosystem?
- (a) A tax imposed by the government on all digital transactions
- (b) A charge associated with processing merchant payments, generally shared among payment system participants
- (c) An interest rate charged by banks on savings accounts
- (d) A penalty imposed on merchants for accepting digital payments
Click to reveal answer
What is the Merchant Discount Rate (MDR)? Explain its significance in the functioning and sustainability of digital payment systems. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
Removing the odds between safety and freedom
In Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish (October 2026), the Supreme Court recognised the right to access and use the internet as a fundamental right under Articles 21 and 19(1)(a), and held that children enjoy it irrespective of age. The Court stressed that for children the internet is a gateway to knowledge, creativity and self-expression, called the idea that safety and freedom are at odds a “false notion”, and cautioned against copying foreign models of blanket restrictions. The ruling comes as States like Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka plan screen-time curbs for children.
Key Facts
- Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran.
- Holding: the right to access and use the internet is a fundamental right of every individual, including children, under Articles 21 and 19(1)(a).
- Origin: the matter arose in follow-up proceedings on detecting and removing child sexual exploitation and abuse material (CSEAM) online, after the Court’s September 2024 judgment in the same case.
- Blanket bans rejected: safety concerns justify proportionate safeguards, not keeping children off the internet altogether.
- Context: Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka plan screen-time curbs for children.
Key Observations of the Court and the Author
- Right, not privilege: internet access is a human right and part of free speech and expression.
- Safety and freedom are complementary: protecting children does not mean restricting their freedom.
- No imitation of foreign models: the balance must be consciously decided for India’s context.
- Authority-liberty coordination: the Constitution limits both State power and individual liberty; overreach by either harms democracy.
- Shared responsibility: parents, government, schools and service providers must act together.
| Case | Year | Holding |
|---|---|---|
| Cricket Association of Bengal | 1995 | Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to know, and to receive and impart information and ideas |
| Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India | 2020 | Speech and trade through the internet are protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) |
| Pragya Prasun v. Union of India | 2025 | Digital access is part of the right to life; excluding persons with disabilities from digital KYC violated Article 21 |
| Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish | 2026 | Internet access is a fundamental right under Articles 21 and 19(1)(a), for children too |
Static Dimensions
- International practice: Australia, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and the UAE restrict children’s social media use through screen-time limits or age rules. In Brazil, children’s accounts must be linked to a legal guardian.
- Theoretical basis: Amartya Sen’s capability approach and Joseph Stiglitz’s emphasis on transformation both support access to digital tools as a driver of development.
- Legal framework: IT Act, 2000 and IT Rules, 2021 (intermediary due diligence, takedowns); Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (verifiable parental consent; no tracking or targeted advertising aimed at children); POCSO Act, 2012 (online child sexual abuse material); Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (cyber stalking, harassment); Cyber Crime Portal and Helpline 1930.
- Reasonable restrictions: Article 19(2) allows limits, but they must satisfy proportionality, as laid down in Puttaswamy (2017) and Anuradha Bhasin.
- Child rights: the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which India has ratified.
Challenges
- Online harms: cyberbullying, harassment, privacy violations, financial fraud and obscene content.
- Digital divide: many children, especially girls and rural children, lack devices and connectivity, so the right may stay on paper.
- Age verification: hard to implement without intrusive data collection.
- Platform accountability: enforcement against intermediaries and algorithm-driven content remains weak.
- Low digital literacy: parents and teachers often lack the skills to guide children.
- Federal variation: different State-level curbs may create an inconsistent patchwork.
Way Forward
- Age-appropriate design: child-safe defaults, content filters and parental controls on platforms.
- Proportionality test: any restriction should be legal, necessary and the least intrusive option.
- Digital literacy: cyber safety and critical thinking in school curricula; training for parents and teachers.
- Platform accountability: stronger duties, algorithmic transparency and swift grievance redress.
- Bridge the divide: affordable connectivity and devices through BharatNet and PM eVidya.
- Preventive over punitive: awareness, counselling and early intervention rather than blanket bans.
- Cooperative federalism: a uniform national framework instead of fragmented State rules.
- Child participation: include children’s views in policymaking.
India Implications
- Digital inclusion: access builds skills, opinion formation and connections across geographies.
- Constitutional evolution: Articles 19 and 21 are extended to the digital sphere.
- Policy guidance: the ruling checks States from adopting blunt, restrictive measures.
- Development goals: it supports SDG 4 (quality education) and SDG 9 (innovation and infrastructure).
Himachal angle: In remote areas such as Lahaul-Spiti, Pangi and upper Chamba, patchy mobile and broadband coverage means the new right will stay on paper for many children unless BharatNet and tower coverage improve. The pandemic years, when schooling moved online, showed how device and network gaps hit hill students hardest.
With reference to the Supreme Court’s observations in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish (2026), consider the following statements:
- The Court recognised internet access as a fundamental right under Articles 21 and 19(1)(a).
- The Court held that children’s online safety can be ensured only through restrictions on internet access.
- The Court emphasised that safety and freedom are complementary rather than contradictory.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- (a) 1 and 2 only
- (b) 1 and 3 only
- (c) 2 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2 and 3
Click to reveal answer
Discuss how access to the internet has become an important instrument for exercising freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
CBG blending at 1.7% in H1; pipeline connectivity key to achieving 3% target
The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) said India achieved 1.7% blending of compressed biogas (CBG) with domestic piped natural gas (D-PNG) and CNG in April–September of the current fiscal. Sales must accelerate in the second half to meet the mandated 3% target.
Key Facts
- Targets: 3% this fiscal, 4% in 2027-28 and 5% in 2028-29.
- H1 sales: CBG sales were 115.9 MMSCM against combined CNG and D-PNG sales of 6,800 MMSCM.
- Gap: with full-year consumption projected at 13,600 MMSCM, CBG sales must reach 408 MMSCM – an additional 292.1 MMSCM.
- Plants: of 210 functional CBG plants, average capacity utilisation is only 44%.
Key Concern: Pipeline Connectivity
- Missing links: 247 of the 308 plants under construction have no pipeline connectivity plans.
- Better utilisation: plants with a pipeline, or one under construction, use 65–69% of designed capacity.
- Assured offtake: a pipeline gives a plant a buyer every day of the year.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| CBG sales, April–September | 115.9 MMSCM |
| CNG + D-PNG sales, April–September | 6,800 MMSCM |
| Blending achieved in H1 | 1.7% |
| Projected full-year gas consumption | 13,600 MMSCM |
| CBG needed for 3% | 408 MMSCM |
| Additional CBG needed in H2 | 292.1 MMSCM |
| Plant category | Capacity utilisation |
|---|---|
| All 210 functional plants (average) | 44% |
| Plants with a pipeline, or one under construction | 65–69% |
| Plants under construction without pipeline plans | 247 of 308 |
Static Dimensions
- CBG: biogas purified to over 90% methane and compressed; its composition and energy content are similar to CNG.
- CBG Blending Obligation: announced in November 2023 by the National Biofuel Coordination Committee; voluntary until 2024-25, mandatory from 2025-26 (1%), rising to 5% by 2028-29.
- SATAT (2018): Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation – promotes CBG plants and the sale of CBG as automotive and industrial fuel.
- GOBARdhan (2018): umbrella scheme for biogas and CBG under Swachh Bharat Mission (Grameen).
- Other links: National Policy on Biofuels, 2018 (amended 2022); Market Development Assistance for Fermented Organic Manure (FOM); PNGRB, the statutory regulator under the PNGRB Act, 2006.
Challenges
- Offtake uncertainty: plants without pipelines depend on cascade transport and limited buyers.
- Feedstock logistics: supply of biomass and waste is irregular.
- Pricing: viability concerns for producers.
- Time pressure: a steep increase is needed in H2.
Way Forward
- Mandate pipeline connectivity during plant approval.
- Expand city gas distribution and grid access.
- Strengthen feedstock supply chains and FOM markets.
- Ensure remunerative, stable pricing and enforce blending obligations.
India Implications
- Energy security: reduces dependence on imported natural gas.
- Waste management: converts agricultural residue, municipal waste and cattle dung into fuel.
- Climate goals: cuts methane emissions and supports the net-zero target.
- Rural income: creates farmer income and jobs.
Himachal angle: Himachal has the feedstock – cattle dung, crop residue, apple pomace and urban waste – but hilly terrain and a thin gas pipeline network mean large plants would face exactly the offtake problem the PNGRB flags. Smaller plants serving local users, with fermented organic manure supplying the State’s natural-farming push, may suit hill conditions better.
With reference to Compressed Biogas (CBG), consider the following statements:
- CBG is produced by purifying and compressing biogas, and its composition is similar to that of CNG.
- The SATAT initiative promotes CBG production and its use as an automotive and industrial fuel.
- The CBG blending obligation applies only to CNG used in vehicles and not to piped natural gas supplied to households.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
- (a) 1 and 2 only
- (b) 2 and 3 only
- (c) 1 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2 and 3
Click to reveal answer
What is Compressed Biogas (CBG)? Discuss its potential role in strengthening India’s energy security. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
Editorial: A middle power moment in a fragmenting world
Shashi Tharoor, Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, argues that this is a “middle power moment”. The theme gained salience this year, beginning with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s call at Davos in January for middle powers to act together on challenges to the international system. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar also spoke on the topic in Delhi in October. Tharoor’s book Pax Indica has been reissued with a new Introduction.
Key Facts
- Concept: middle powers neither dominate the international system nor submit passively to it. Their influence comes from strategic positioning, economic weight, diplomatic agility and normative ambition.
- Examples: India, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, South Africa, Japan, Indonesia, Türkiye, Mexico and Germany. South Korea, the Netherlands, the UAE, Nigeria and Qatar may fit in specific areas.
- Defining traits: regional influence, growing economic capacity, credible diplomatic networks and willingness to act beyond the neighbourhood – using coalition-building, agenda-setting and bridging rather than coercion.
- Order under strain: the UN Security Council still reflects 1945 power realities, and its legitimacy suffers from poor representation and inconsistent adherence to international law.
Key Arguments
- Rule-takers, not yet rule-makers: middle powers are increasingly norm-shapers for their own camps rather than a unified bloc.
- Reform, not dismantling: the task is to make the order more representative and credible while preserving its capacity to restrain power.
- Expanding yet constrained space: great-power consensus has eroded and institutions are paralysed, which limits collective action but also opens room for initiative.
- Bridge role: the ability to speak to both the West and the Global South gives them unique leverage.
- Cooperation with great powers: the Quad, BRICS, IMEC, the Belt and Road Initiative and INSTC all involve both middle and great powers.
- Stabilisers: middle powers will not replace great powers but will moderate, mediate and innovate.
| Country | Area of agency cited |
|---|---|
| India | G-20 presidency (2023) |
| Brazil | Climate diplomacy |
| South Africa | Health and vaccine equity |
| Germany | European stability and Indo-Pacific engagement |
| Aspect | Great powers | Middle powers |
|---|---|---|
| Position | Dominate or shape the system | Neither dominate nor submit passively |
| Main tools | Military and economic weight, including coercion | Coalition-building, agenda-setting, bridging |
| Role in the order | Rule-makers | Norm-shapers, mediators and stabilisers |
| Exposure | Better able to absorb shocks | More vulnerable to sanctions, tariffs and economic shocks |
Static Dimensions
- UN Security Council: 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms; India last served in 2021–22. The G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) seeks permanent seats.
- India’s G-20 presidency (2023): the African Union was admitted as a permanent member; IMEC was announced on its sidelines.
- Global South platforms: Voice of the Global South Summit (first held in January 2023), IBSA (2003) and BRICS.
- Connectivity: INSTC (agreement of 2000 among India, Iran and Russia) and IMEC (2023).
- Concepts: strategic autonomy, multi-alignment, reformed multilateralism and issue-based coalitions.
Challenges
- No unified bloc: divergent and sometimes conflicting interests limit collective action.
- Economic vulnerability: more exposed than superpowers to shocks, sanctions and tariffs.
- US unpredictability: shifts in Washington’s posture, including uncertainty after the US midterm results, complicate planning.
- China factor: border tensions and economic asymmetry constrain India’s balancing options.
- Capability gaps: limited military, technological and financial capacity restricts rule-shaping.
- Institutional paralysis: UNSC deadlock and WTO dysfunction reduce avenues for reform.
- Credibility: acting as a rule-shaper needs domestic consistency on rule of law and human rights.
Way Forward
- Issue-based coalitions: flexible groupings on digital governance, climate finance, health security and development cooperation.
- Reformed multilateralism: UNSC expansion, IMF and World Bank quota reform and WTO revitalisation, while defending core international law.
- Mediation: neutral platforms in conflicts where great powers are distrusted.
- Economic resilience: diversify trade, strengthen manufacturing and critical supply chains, deepen FTAs.
- Capability building: invest in defence, technology, AI and semiconductors.
- Regional leadership: stabilise the neighbourhood through connectivity, trade and development assistance.
- Global South partnership: use the Voice of the Global South Summit, BRICS and IBSA.
India Implications
- Strategic autonomy: multi-alignment lets India pursue advantageous ties with many partners amid great-power rivalry.
- Global South voice: India can champion development, climate justice, equitable trade and technology access.
- UNSC reform: the moment strengthens India’s case for permanent membership.
- Neighbourhood pressures: unresolved border issues make India’s view of China different from Brazil’s or Indonesia’s, so ties with the US and Russia remain a pragmatic necessity.
- Economic security: fragmenting supply chains create risk and opportunity for India as an alternative manufacturing hub.
Himachal angle: Himachal shares a border with Tibet (China) in Kinnaur and Lahaul-Spiti, so the “China factor” is a local reality. Shipki La in Kinnaur is one of the passes India and China agreed in 2025 to reopen for border trade – a small test of the pragmatic engagement the editorial calls for. Deeper FTAs also carry local stakes: the State’s apple growers watch tariff concessions on imported apples closely.
“The emerging international order presents middle powers with both greater opportunities and greater responsibilities.” Critically analyse this statement with reference to India’s foreign policy. (15 Marks, 250 Words)
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