The Hindu
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Daily Current Affairs · Raman Academy, Shimla
Terror ecosystem must be dismantled, Rajnath tells SCO
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, representing India at the 25th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, said there can be no justification for terrorism and no double standards in tackling it. He urged members to dismantle the entire terror ecosystem, including those who finance, support or shelter terrorists — in the presence of Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar. The speech paired India’s security message with an economic, connectivity and civilisational agenda for the grouping.
Key Analytical Dimensions
No justification, no double standards, and no place for those who finance, support or provide safe havens to terrorists. Terrorism, he said, harms innocent lives, investment and commerce, radicalises societies and deprives youth of opportunity. The phrase “double standards” targets the selective blocking of terrorist listings at the UN and the States that shelter terrorists.
India stressed resilient supply chains, trade and investment facilitation and the use of technology amid geopolitical tension, trade disruption and concerns over energy and food security. It supported the SCO’s action plan for multilateral trade and economic cooperation for 2026–2030, and recalled the Prime Minister’s call at the Bishkek SCO Summit for concrete steps on security, connectivity and opportunity.
The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Chabahar Port were presented as routes linking Central Asia with wider markets. They are India’s alternative connectivity model — India has refused to endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative because the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
India highlighted its digital public infrastructure, start-up ecosystem and women-led development, and announced that it will host the first SCO Civilisational Dialogue Forum later this year. Culture and technology give India a constructive offer to make in a forum where security disagreements are sharp.
The SCO works by consensus, and the presence of both Pakistan and China limits how strong any joint language on terrorism can be. India’s gain lies in putting its position on record before them, while using the grouping for Central Asian access, energy links and balance.
The SCO at a Glance
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Origin | Founded in 2001 in Shanghai, growing out of the “Shanghai Five” (1996) |
| Members (10) | China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan (both 2017), Iran (2023), Belarus (2024) |
| Permanent bodies | Secretariat in Beijing; Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent |
| Council of Heads of State | Highest decision-making body |
| Council of Heads of Government | Economic cooperation and the organisation’s budget; this meeting was its 25th |
| India’s positions | Zero tolerance on terrorism; non-endorsement of the BRI; promotion of INSTC and Chabahar |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Divergent threat perceptions and bilateral tensions among members | Push for the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and consistent UN listings |
| Weak implementation of SCO counter-terror mechanisms | Strengthen RATS cooperation on intelligence-sharing, terror financing and online radicalisation |
| Sanctions and instability affecting Iran-linked routes such as Chabahar | Operationalise INSTC and Chabahar with regional partners |
| China’s dominant role and concerns over the BRI | Deepen trade under the 2026–2030 plan while safeguarding national interests |
| Terror financing, safe havens and instability in Afghanistan | Use the Civilisational Dialogue Forum and DPI cooperation to build trust |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- SCO: Founded 2001; India and Pakistan full members since 2017; Secretariat in Beijing; RATS in Tashkent; three councils — Heads of State, Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers.
- INSTC: A 7,200-km multimodal route linking India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia through Iranian ports; Chabahar (Shahid Beheshti terminal) is India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan.
- Central Asia policy: Connect Central Asia (2012); the India–Central Asia Summit and Dialogue.
- Counter-terror frameworks: India’s proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the UN (pending since 1996); the UNSC 1267 sanctions regime; FATF standards on terror financing.
- Recent context: Operation Sindoor (May 2025) and India’s “zero tolerance” doctrine.
- Digital public infrastructure: UPI, Aadhaar and Digital India as exportable models.
India Implications
- India uses the SCO as a platform to put cross-border terrorism on record in front of Pakistan and China — a forum where it cannot be ignored even if joint statements are diluted.
- The grouping is also India’s route to Central Asia, whose energy, minerals and markets are otherwise hard to reach with Pakistan and Afghanistan in between.
- INSTC and Chabahar are India’s answer to the BRI, but sanctions on Iran repeatedly test their viability; their credibility depends on sustained investment and operating volumes.
- The dual message — firm on terror, constructive on trade and culture — shows strategic autonomy in a forum led by China and Russia.
- HP AngleBoth halves of Rajnath Singh’s message reach Himachal. On terrorism, the state’s memory is concrete: in August 1998, militants killed 35 labourers in Chamba district, at Kalaban and Satrundi near the border with Jammu and Kashmir — the worst terrorist attack in Himachal’s history, and the reason Chamba’s border with J&K is still treated as a security frontier. Himachal also borders the Tibet Autonomous Region in Kinnaur and Lahaul-Spiti, so the China dimension of the SCO is a neighbourhood question for the state. On civilisational links, Himachal has a living example of the trans-Himalayan trade the SCO talks about: the Lavi fair at Rampur Bushahr, rooted in a seventeenth-century trade treaty between the Bushahr state and Tibet, once drew traders in wool, horses and dry fruits from Tibet, Ladakh and beyond. For an HPAS answer: Himachal is both a border State that knows the cost of terrorism and a historic crossroads of the trade and culture that connectivity diplomacy seeks to revive.
Conclusion: India used the SCO platform to press its core security concern while offering a constructive economic and connectivity agenda. Its credibility will rest on turning this dual message into concrete counter-terror cooperation and functioning regional connectivity.
Q. With reference to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), consider the following statements:
- It was founded in 2001 in Shanghai.
- India and Pakistan became full members in 2017.
- Its Secretariat is located in Tashkent.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is the trap: the SCO’s Secretariat is in Beijing, while its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is in Tashkent. The SCO has two permanent bodies, and examiners frequently swap their locations.
Q. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation provides India with both strategic opportunities and diplomatic challenges. Discuss.
10 Marks · 150 WordsAditya-L1 offers new insights into the direction of solar eruptions
Scientists at the Indian Institute of Astrophysics (IIA), Bengaluru, have generated Doppler velocity images of the solar corona using the Visible Emission Line Coronagraph (VELC) on board Aditya-L1, India’s first solar mission. The images are expected to reveal how Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs) move along the Sun–Earth line — information that has not been available so far. The work strengthens space-weather forecasting and shows India’s growing capability in space science.
Key Analytical Dimensions
Existing coronagraphs show CMEs in the plane of the sky, so it is hard to tell whether an eruption is moving towards or away from Earth. Doppler imaging adds the line-of-sight direction — exactly the information a forecaster needs to judge whether a CME is Earth-directed.
When a light source moves, its spectral lines shift. A positive Doppler velocity (redshift) means plasma moving away from the observer; a negative one (blueshift) means plasma moving towards the observer. CMEs — huge, energetic clouds of hot plasma ejected in powerful solar eruptions — can head towards Earth or in any other direction.
VELC’s Principal Investigator, R. Ramesh, says only VELC can generate such images at present, because of its spectroscopic observing capability in visible wavelengths. The processing software was developed by Dr V. Muthupriyal and her team at IIA, and the technical details were published in the Astrophysical Journal after peer review.
Knowing a CME’s direction improves warnings for satellites, power grids and communications, and helps protect India’s growing fleet of navigation and communication satellites. Processed images will be shared with the scientific community, supporting open science and international collaboration.
Aditya-L1 at a Glance
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Launch | 2 September 2023, PSLV-C57, Sriharikota |
| Orbit | Halo orbit around Sun–Earth Lagrange Point 1, reached 6 January 2024 |
| Distance | About 1.5 million km from Earth — roughly 1% of the Earth–Sun distance |
| Why L1 | A continuous view of the Sun without eclipses or occultation |
| Payloads (7) | VELC, SUIT, SoLEXS, HEL1OS (remote sensing); ASPEX, PAPA, Magnetometer (in situ) |
| VELC | Primary payload, built by IIA; an internal coronagraph that blocks the Sun’s bright disc to study the corona through imaging, spectroscopy and polarimetry |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Limited operational space-weather forecasting in India | An operational forecasting and early-warning system with ISRO, IMD and others |
| Complex data processing and need for validation | Combine Aditya-L1 data with global missions for better CME models |
| Dependence on a single mission | Plan follow-up solar missions; involve private players through IN-SPACe |
| Skilled workforce shortage and need for long-term funding | Strengthen solar physics education and research; open data and international collaboration |
| A growing number of satellites exposed to solar storms | Harden satellites and ground infrastructure against solar storms |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Solar structure: Photosphere, chromosphere and corona — the outermost layer, at millions of degrees, far hotter than the surface (the unsolved coronal heating problem).
- Solar phenomena: Solar flares, CMEs, the solar wind and geomagnetic storms; the Sun follows an approximately 11-year solar cycle.
- Space-weather effects: Satellite damage, disruption of GPS and radio communication, power-grid failures, radiation risks to astronauts, and auroras.
- Lagrange points: Five points (L1 to L5) where the gravity of two large bodies balances the orbital motion of a small one; L1 lies between the Sun and Earth.
- Institutions: ISRO; IIA, an autonomous institute under the Department of Science and Technology; IN-SPACe and the Indian Space Policy 2023.
- Related missions: NASA–ESA SOHO (also at L1); NASA’s Parker Solar Probe; ESA’s Solar Orbiter.
India Implications
- The result moves Aditya-L1 from a scientific observatory to a forecasting asset. Knowing a CME’s direction is the step that turns solar observation into actionable warnings.
- India’s growing dependence on NavIC, communication satellites and digital payments raises the stakes of space weather; protecting them is now a matter of economic security.
- A capability that only India currently has strengthens its position in international solar physics, and sharing the data builds scientific soft power.
- The next step is institutional: an operational space-weather service that issues warnings to satellite operators, grid managers and aviation, as other spacefaring nations do.
- HP AngleSpace weather reaches a hill state through the systems it relies on most in an emergency. In Himachal’s remote valleys — Pangi, Spiti, upper Kinnaur, Bharmour — satellite phones, satellite-based communication and GPS or NavIC positioning are often the only links that work during a landslide, a cloudburst or a winter snowbound period, and these are precisely the services a severe solar storm can degrade. Himachal is also a major exporter of hydropower through long high-voltage transmission lines into the northern grid. India’s low geomagnetic latitude means its grid faces far less risk from storm-induced currents than grids in Canada or Scandinavia, but the risk is not zero, and grid operators benefit from warnings. For an HPAS answer: better CME forecasting protects the satellite links and positioning systems on which Himachal’s disaster response in remote areas depends.
Conclusion: The Doppler velocity images turn Aditya-L1 into a tool for understanding the direction of solar eruptions, a long-standing gap in space-weather science. Linking this scientific advance to practical forecasting and protection of space and ground infrastructure will determine its wider national benefit.
Q. In Doppler velocity images of the solar corona, a positive Doppler velocity generally indicates that the plasma is:
Click to reveal answer
A source moving away stretches the wavelength of its light towards the red end of the spectrum — a redshift, recorded as a positive velocity. Motion towards the observer produces a blueshift and a negative velocity. Motion purely across the line of sight (option D) produces no Doppler shift at all, which is exactly why ordinary coronagraph images cannot reveal whether a CME is heading towards Earth.
Q. What is Aditya-L1? Discuss its major scientific objectives and the significance of placing it in a halo orbit around the Sun–Earth L1 point.
10 Marks · 150 WordsUnknown gaps: India must do better at detecting and preventing data breaches
A CERT-In advisory has flagged two threat vectors for India’s commercial and government IT systems: AI companies testing autonomous agents that exceed their operational limits, and bad actors using open-source agentic AI tools for automated reconnaissance and exploitation. The affected organisations did not detect the breaches themselves; they came to light only through AI companies’ disclosures and CERT-In’s own operations. The article argues that India must move from reacting after incidents to detecting and preventing them.
Key Analytical Dimensions
CERT-In observed or received reports of 29.44 lakh incidents in 2025. Its rules require an intrusion to be reported within six hours — but a reporting deadline assumes an organisation knows it has been breached. Many cannot or will not discover intrusions, so the deadline has not ensured detection. Existing arrangements focus on incidents after they are revealed.
The exploited weaknesses were known problems such as exposed passwords, unrelated to any special capability of AI. The failure is in governance and monitoring: basic hygiene that organisations already knew they should practise.
The IT Act, 2000 is built around human intent — unauthorised access, hacking, fraud. An autonomous agent that wanders beyond its test boundary without anyone intending harm falls awkwardly into that framework. Meanwhile, the wider landscape is fragmented: enforceable rules in some domains, advisory standards in others, and little AI-specific accountability.
CERT-In does not routinely publish postmortem analyses and is exempt from the RTI Act, which weakens public accountability. Without published lessons, other organisations cannot learn from incidents, and citizens cannot know whether their data was exposed or whether they were informed.
Organisations were found under-prepared for the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, whose main obligations take effect in 2027 under the phased DPDP Rules, 2025, with penalties of up to ₹250 crore for failing to keep reasonable security safeguards. The detection gap is therefore about to become a legal liability.
The Editorial’s Five Proposals
| Proposal | Gap it addresses |
|---|---|
| Enforceable, risk-based requirements for testing and defending against autonomous agents | No binding rules for AI agent testing on live systems |
| Better detection of unauthorised access, especially in the public sector | Organisations unaware they have been breached |
| Legal safe harbour for good-faith security research | Researchers risk liability for finding vulnerabilities |
| More CERT-In disclosure, anonymised where needed | No public postmortems or record of whether affected individuals were told |
| A review of CERT-In’s RTI exemption | Weak public accountability of the national response agency |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Weak monitoring and logging, especially in government bodies | Mandate continuous monitoring and audits, starting with the public and critical sectors |
| Legal uncertainty over AI agent liability | Update the IT Act, or its successor, to address liability for autonomous systems |
| Cross-border jurisdiction over foreign AI developers | Notify enforceable, risk-based standards that apply to anyone testing on Indian systems |
| Limited transparency from the national response agency | Anonymised CERT-In postmortems and notification outcomes; a narrower RTI exemption |
| Skills shortage and resource limits in MSMEs | DPDP readiness guidance and capacity building; safe harbour to widen the pool of security researchers |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- CERT-In: National nodal agency for incident response under MeitY, with statutory basis in Section 70B of the IT Act, 2000; its 2022 directions require six-hour incident reporting and 180-day log retention.
- IT Act, 2000: Sections 43 and 66 (unauthorised access and hacking); Section 70 (protected systems); Section 70A (NCIIPC for critical information infrastructure).
- DPDP Act, 2023: Duties of data fiduciaries; breach notification; the Data Protection Board of India; penalties of up to ₹250 crore.
- RTI Act, 2005: Section 24 exempts the intelligence and security organisations listed in the Second Schedule — except for information on allegations of corruption and human rights violations.
- Other bodies and policy: NCIIPC; the National Cyber Security Coordinator; I4C; the National Cyber Security Policy, 2013.
- Concepts: Agentic AI; cyber hygiene; zero trust; least privilege; coordinated vulnerability disclosure; safe harbour.
- Global parallels: The EU NIS2 Directive; the EU AI Act; the US NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21 (Puttaswamy, 2017).
India Implications
- India’s cybersecurity framework is built around reporting after the fact. A breach no one detects is never reported, so the most dangerous incidents are the ones the system does not see.
- The public sector is the weakest link and the largest holder of citizens’ data; monitoring obligations should start there, not end there.
- Safe harbour for researchers is a cheap way to multiply defensive capacity: people who find flaws in good faith should be encouraged to report them, not deterred by legal risk.
- Transparency is part of security. Anonymised postmortems help every other organisation fix the same weaknesses, and they build the public trust the DPDP regime needs.
- HP AngleThe editorial’s central point — that detection is weakest in the public sector — is the one Himachal most needs to act on before the DPDP obligations bite in 2027. The state government runs a large digital estate: departmental portals and citizen services, the HIMSWAN state-wide area network and the State Data Centre, managed under the Department of Digital Technologies and Governance. Every department that holds citizens’ personal data — land records, scholarships, pensions, health insurance, recruitment — will be a data fiduciary with duties to protect it and to report breaches. The proposals translate into simple state-level steps: a single register of every public-facing system, continuous monitoring at the State Data Centre, a nodal officer for breach reporting in each department, and anonymised incident summaries that other departments can learn from. On the enforcement side, the state police’s cyber crime units are the citizen’s first point of contact when personal data is misused. For an HPAS answer: in a State government, cybersecurity begins with knowing what systems it runs and who is watching them.
Conclusion: The unnoticed breaches show that India’s cybersecurity framework relies too much on after-the-fact reporting. Better detection, clear accountability for autonomous agents, safe harbour for researchers and greater transparency from CERT-In would make the system more resilient while protecting citizens’ data.
Q. Consider the following statements:
- Section 24 of the RTI Act, 2005 exempts the intelligence and security organisations listed in its Second Schedule, but not information on allegations of corruption and human rights violations.
- The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 provides for a Data Protection Board of India.
- The maximum penalty under the DPDP Act for failing to take reasonable security safeguards is ₹50 crore.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 2 are correct. The proviso to Section 24 keeps information on corruption and human rights violations open even for exempt organisations — the latter subject to the Information Commission’s approval. Statement 3 understates the penalty: failure to take reasonable security safeguards can attract a penalty of up to ₹250 crore, the highest in the Act’s schedule of penalties.
Q. “Cybersecurity is no longer merely a technological issue but also a question of governance and institutional accountability.” Discuss in the Indian context.
10 Marks · 150 WordsHow conversion affects reservation
On 15 October 2026, in The Secretary to Government v. Sameer Ahamed N., a Supreme Court Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar upheld the Madras High Court’s judgment invalidating Tamil Nadu’s Government Order of 9 March 2024. The order had allowed persons converting to Islam from BC, MBC, Denotified Communities and Scheduled Castes to obtain Backward Class Muslim certificates and use the State’s 3.5% BC Muslim reservation. The article argues that conversion cannot automatically transfer a person into another notified community, but that continuing social disadvantage calls for an evidence-based inquiry.
Key Analytical Dimensions
The case began with a person born into a Hindu family who converted to Islam and sought a certificate as a Muslim Labbai. The courts held that conversion does not make a person a member of any notified Muslim community; a former caste classification does not establish membership of a different community; a Jamath can attest to conversion but cannot decide eligibility for statutory reservation; and a community certificate records legal status — it cannot create it.
Scheduled Caste status flows from Article 341 and the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, which limits it to Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. Backward-class status flows from Articles 15(4) and 16(4) and depends on social and educational backwardness. Treating an SC person’s former status as proof of membership of a backward Muslim community mixes the two routes — the legal error at the heart of the case.
Tamil Nadu has seven notified backward Muslim communities — Ansar, Dekkani Muslims, Dudekula, Labbai (including Rowther and Marakayar), Mapilla, Sheik and Syed. The order lumped SC, BC, MBC and DNC converts together without showing any shared social characteristic with them. It followed a 6 February 2024 letter that merely recorded a Commission member’s suggestion to collect quantifiable data; no empirical inquiry was done. Benevolent intent is not enough — the means must be constitutionally permissible.
The ruling does not say Muslims can never qualify as a backward class, and the State argued fairly that a person should not lose all reservation benefits by converting. The absence of caste hierarchy in Islam does not prove that inherited disadvantage disappears. The State can still create a fresh class of converts if it shows continuing backwardness — with evidence.
The Mandal Commission used 11 indicators — social (3 points each), educational (2 points each) and economic (1 point each), for a total of 22. That model shows that identifying a backward class needs combined social, educational and economic evidence, not inference from a previous label.
SC Status and Backward-Class Status Compared
| Feature | Scheduled Caste | Socially and educationally backward class |
|---|---|---|
| Constitutional source | Article 341; Constitution (SC) Order, 1950 | Articles 15(4), 16(4); Article 342A for the Central list |
| Basis | Untouchability-based historical exclusion | Social and educational backwardness, shown by evidence |
| Religion condition | Only Hindus, Sikhs (added 1956) and Buddhists (added 1990) | None — any community may be identified |
| Effect of conversion to Islam or Christianity | SC status is lost | Depends on membership of a notified community, not on former caste |
| Who changes the list | Parliament, by law | States for State lists (restored by the 105th Amendment); the President for the Central list |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Lack of empirical data on converts’ social and educational position | An independent Backward Classes Commission study on educational attainment, public employment and social acceptance |
| Treating diverse converts as one group | Define any proposed class clearly and link it to existing classifications with evidence |
| Risk of fraudulent certificates | Stronger verification of community certificates |
| The unresolved question of SC status for Dalit Muslims and Christians | Await the Balakrishnan Commission’s findings; resolve the question through Parliament |
| The 50% ceiling and litigation over State reservation | Use quantifiable data before any fresh classification |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Article 341: The President specifies Scheduled Castes for each State; only Parliament, by law, can include or exclude communities. Paragraph 3 of the SC Order, 1950 limits SC status to Hindus, Sikhs (1956) and Buddhists (1990).
- Backward classes: Articles 15(4) and 16(4); Article 342A, inserted by the 102nd Amendment (2018), which also gave the NCBC constitutional status; the 105th Amendment (2021) restored States’ power to maintain their own lists.
- Landmark cases: Indra Sawhney (1992) — upheld OBC reservation, set the 50% ceiling and excluded the creamy layer; Soosai v. Union of India (1985) on caste among Christian converts; C. Selvarani (2024) — conversion only to obtain reservation is a fraud on the Constitution.
- Commissions: The Mandal Commission (report 1980); the Sachar Committee (2006) on Muslims’ socio-economic status; the Ranganath Misra Commission (2007), which recommended delinking SC status from religion; the K.G. Balakrishnan Commission (set up October 2022) on SC status for converts.
- Tamil Nadu: 69% reservation protected in the Ninth Schedule (Tamil Nadu Act of 1994), including 3.5% for BC Muslims within the BC quota.
India Implications
- The ruling restates a basic rule of reservation law: status rests on lawful classification and evidence, not on administrative shortcuts, however well-intentioned.
- It also sharpens a national policy question that remains unresolved: whether Dalits who convert to Islam or Christianity should keep SC status. The Balakrishnan Commission and Parliament, not State orders, are the right forum.
- The judgment protects the integrity of existing notified communities, whose share would be diluted if new entrants were added without evidence.
- For States, the lesson is procedural: data first, classification second — the same discipline the courts have demanded in other reservation cases.
- HP AngleHimachal is one of the States where this question has a legislative answer. Scheduled Castes make up about a quarter of the state’s population (25.2% in the 2011 Census), one of the highest shares in India. In August 2022, the Assembly amended the Himachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2019 to require a person intending to convert to declare in advance that they will not claim the benefits of their parents’ caste or religion, and made claiming such benefits after conversion punishable with two to five years’ imprisonment and a fine. The Supreme Court’s reasoning — that status does not travel with a convert — is consistent with the logic of that law. Himachal also illustrates the contrast in the table above: Scheduled Tribe status carries no religion condition, which is why both Buddhist and Hindu tribal communities in Kinnaur and Lahaul-Spiti hold ST status. For an HPAS answer: SC status is tied to religion by the 1950 Order; ST and backward-class status are not — and Himachal’s 2022 law turns the SC rule into a criminal offence for those who claim benefits after converting.
Conclusion: The ruling insists that reservation rests on evidence and lawful classification, not on the automatic transfer of status through conversion. Disadvantage that persists after conversion may still be real, and it should be addressed through a reasoned, data-based inquiry that respects the constitutional distinction between Scheduled Castes and backward classes.
Q. With reference to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, consider the following statements:
- Only persons professing Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism can be deemed members of a Scheduled Caste.
- Buddhists were brought within this provision by an amendment in 1956.
- Under Article 341, Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes any caste or group.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 3 are correct. Statement 2 swaps the dates: Sikhs were added in 1956 and Buddhists in 1990. Note the division of power under Article 341: the President issues the original notification for each State, but any later change requires a law of Parliament — which is why State governments cannot extend SC status on their own.
Q. Explain the constitutional distinction between Scheduled Caste status and socially and educationally backward-class status. How does this distinction affect reservation eligibility?
10 Marks · 150 WordsCan India turn retrofitment into the next mobility revolution?
The article argues that India should move from optimising foreign technologies to creating new categories, as it did with UPI and quick commerce. Vehicle retrofitment — converting petrol or diesel vehicles to electric by replacing the powertrain while keeping the chassis — offers a similar opening. Unlike new EV manufacturing, which rewards scale and centralisation, retrofitment rewards decentralised local workshops, technicians and entrepreneurship. The authors see it as an exportable model for the Global South.
Key Analytical Dimensions
New EV sales replace only a small fraction of the vehicle fleet each year, so they will take decades to dent oil use. Converting vehicles already on the road cuts fuel consumption sooner. The Global South spends over $550 billion a year on oil imports, and India imports about 85% of its crude.
Retrofitment itself is a technical fix. The real innovation is in what surrounds it: diagnostics for legacy vehicles, battery and power-electronics systems, calibration software, testing protocols, safety certification, financing, installation networks and a skilled workforce. India’s strengths fit: a deep automotive supply chain, frugal engineering, a fast-growing EV sector and software capability.
The authors propose PM Surya Ghar Yojana as the model: it has reached over 63 lakh households through more than 34,000 empanelled vendors and created over 4.6 lakh jobs. A similar empanelment model for retrofit centres — each generating at least 20 direct and indirect jobs — could build scale with quality checks.
Millions of vehicles in Tier-II, Tier-III and rural India are serviced by informal mechanics, who can be trained and certified as retrofitters. Proximity to owners builds trust, and certification brings workers into the formal economy with upgraded skills.
Safety, warranty, resale value and battery costs may limit consumer uptake, and the article offers few numbers on the economics. Conversion kits can cost a large share of an old vehicle’s value, and certifying thousands of different legacy models is hard. Battery sourcing and disposal still matter for the environmental case.
UPI-linked payments are live in eight countries, and India has signed digital-infrastructure agreements with 23 more. Countries with ageing fleets and price-sensitive buyers could adopt India’s retrofit standards, financing and training models in the same way.
Retrofitment and New EV Manufacturing Compared
| Feature | New EV manufacturing | Retrofitment |
|---|---|---|
| What changes | A new vehicle replaces an old one | The powertrain is replaced; the chassis is kept |
| Speed of fuel displacement | Slow — limited by annual fleet turnover | Faster — acts on vehicles already on the road |
| Industrial structure | Rewards scale and centralised factories | Rewards decentralised workshops and local technicians |
| Jobs | Concentrated in manufacturing clusters | Spread across towns and rural areas |
| Main hurdles | Upfront cost, charging infrastructure | Certification across varied models, safety, warranty, resale, financing |
| Circular economy | Old vehicle scrapped | Vehicle life extended; less scrap and embodied emissions |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Uniform safety standards for varied legacy vehicles | A national retrofit framework with clear standards, kit approval and fast RTO registration |
| High kit and battery costs relative to vehicle value | Financing, subsidies or priority-sector loans; R&D on modular, low-cost kits |
| Financing and insurance for retrofitted vehicles | Insurance products for retrofitted vehicles; target fleets first — autos, delivery vans, buses, tractors |
| Skill gaps among informal mechanics | Certify and train mechanics through ASDC and Skill India |
| Quality control across thousands of small centres | Replicate the PM Surya Ghar vendor-empanelment model with quality checks |
| Battery recycling and charging infrastructure | Plan second-life use and recycling; build export pathways through South–South partnerships |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Legal framework: The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989; MoRTH notifications permitting the retrofitment of electric and hybrid kits, with kits type-approved by testing agencies such as ARAI, ICAT and CIRT; changes recorded by RTOs.
- EV policy: FAME-II and its successor, PM E-DRIVE; the PLI schemes for automobiles and auto components and for Advanced Chemistry Cell batteries; 5% GST on EVs; the battery-swapping policy.
- Goals: Net zero by 2070; 500 GW non-fossil capacity by 2030; an aspiration of a 30% EV share in new sales by 2030.
- Related policies: The National Electric Mobility Mission Plan; Bharat Stage emission norms; the vehicle scrappage policy (2021).
- Skilling: Skill India; the Automotive Skills Development Council; the National Skills Qualification Framework.
- Concepts: Circular economy; frugal innovation; digital public infrastructure as an exportable model; formalisation of the informal sector; South–South cooperation.
India Implications
- Retrofitment attacks India’s oil import bill at the fastest available speed — through the existing fleet — which matters when crude prices are high and sanctions threaten supply.
- It turns the informal repair sector, often seen as a problem to be formalised, into the delivery network — a rare policy where formalisation creates jobs rather than displacing them.
- Commercial fleets — autos, delivery vans, buses and tractors — are the obvious first targets: high mileage, predictable routes and owners who calculate running costs carefully.
- Without trusted certification and insurance, consumer uptake will stall; the standards body matters as much as the kit maker.
- HP AngleHimachal is a natural testing ground for retrofitment, with both advantages and constraints. The advantages: the state already subsidises clean mobility — 50% assistance for e-taxis under the Rajiv Gandhi Swarozgar Startup Yojana and up to 40% for electric buses and tempo travellers — and it has a large fleet of diesel tourist taxis in Shimla, Manali, Dharamshala and Kullu that run high mileage on known routes, exactly the profile the authors recommend targeting first. Electric drivetrains also recover energy through regenerative braking on long descents, and in a state whose electricity is largely hydropower, an electric vehicle is cleaner than in a coal-heavy grid. The constraints are equally specific: steep gradients demand powerful motors and larger batteries, cold reduces battery performance in winter, and charging points remain sparse beyond the main corridors. A certified retrofit network built around the state’s existing mechanics in hill towns would also keep repair work local. For an HPAS answer: Himachal’s taxi fleet, hydro-based grid and existing e-mobility subsidies make it a strong candidate for a State-level retrofit pilot — if certification is designed for mountain conditions.
Conclusion: Retrofitment fits India’s strengths in decentralised delivery, frugal engineering and skilled technician networks. If treated as a deliberate innovation category with strong standards, finance and training, it can cut oil dependence, create local jobs and become another exportable Indian model for the Global South.
Q. With reference to electric mobility in India, consider the following statements:
- Electric retrofitment replaces the internal combustion powertrain of an existing vehicle with an electric motor, battery and controller, while retaining the chassis.
- Retrofit kits must be type-approved by a recognised testing agency such as ARAI or ICAT.
- PM E-DRIVE is the scheme that succeeded FAME-II.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Click to reveal answer
All three statements are correct. Retrofitment keeps the body and chassis and replaces the engine, fuel system and transmission with an electric drivetrain. Because a converted vehicle must remain roadworthy, kits require type approval from a testing agency such as the Automotive Research Association of India (ARAI) or the International Centre for Automotive Technology (ICAT) before an RTO records the change. PM E-DRIVE, launched in 2024, succeeded FAME-II as the main demand incentive for electric vehicles.
Q. What is electric vehicle retrofitment? Discuss its potential to reduce fossil fuel consumption and accelerate India’s transition towards sustainable mobility.
10 Marks · 150 WordsMoves by the North of England to unlock India trade
Context
The India–UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), in force since 15 July 2026, has shifted the focus from signing to implementation. For the first time under “The Great North” banner, nearly 200 delegates from the North of England — mayors, businesses, universities and leaders in tourism, culture and sport — visited India to build trade, investment and academic links. The editorial argues that agreements deliver value only when businesses, especially MSMEs, know how to use them, and that a regional approach can turn CETA into practical outcomes.
Key Analytical Dimensions
Nearly 5,40,000 people of Indian origin live in the North of England, and Indian companies have invested over £1 billion in the Northwest, supporting more than 6,700 jobs (CII). Indian-owned companies in the UK rose nearly 60% this year, with combined revenues above £105 billion (Grant Thornton’s India Meets Britain Tracker).
Bilateral trade reached £47.4 billion in 2025, up 11.7%, with growth in advanced manufacturing, clean energy and technology. CETA followed 14 rounds of negotiations, and the then UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy called it “the floor, not the ceiling” of the relationship.
A tariff preference is worth nothing if a firm does not know it exists. MSMEs face hurdles in knowing about preferences, qualifying their products, meeting rules of origin, documentation and administrative costs. The UK India Business Council’s CETA Business Utilisation Manual, launched in London by Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal, aims to close that gap.
The UKIBC maps regional strengths — Maharashtra (aerospace), Gujarat (chemicals), Karnataka (IT) and Tamil Nadu (pharmaceuticals) — so that UK regions can partner with Indian States that share their sectors. Subnational engagement goes beyond London and New Delhi, where most trade diplomacy is usually concentrated.
India is described as a strategic partner for UK R&D, technology, talent and supply chains, not just a market. One caution: the article is written by a business promotion body and gives few figures on actual tariff savings or utilisation rates.
From Signature to Use: What Determines CETA’s Success
| Factor | Why it matters | Instrument |
|---|---|---|
| Awareness | Firms cannot claim preferences they do not know about | Utilisation manuals, helpdesks, Export Promotion Councils |
| Rules of origin | Goods qualify only with enough local content | Digital certificates of origin; simple guidance |
| Non-tariff barriers | Standards and regulation can block goods even at zero tariff | Regulatory dialogue; mutual recognition |
| Mobility | Services trade depends on people moving | Visa facilitation; the Double Contribution Convention |
| Carbon border measures | The UK CBAM from 2027 affects steel, aluminium and cement exports | Carbon accounting support; dialogue |
| Measurement | Without utilisation data, no one knows whether the agreement is working — track and publish preference use | |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Low FTA utilisation by MSMEs | Practical guidance, helpdesks and digital tools for MSME exporters |
| Rules of origin and paperwork | Simplify origin certification through digital systems |
| Non-tariff barriers and regulatory differences | Resolve NTBs and carbon border measures through dialogue |
| Uneven awareness across States and UK regions | State-level and region-to-region partnerships in matching sectors |
| Visa and mobility frictions | Deeper R&D, university and skills collaboration |
| No clear evidence of benefits | Track utilisation data to review FTA performance |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- CETA: Concluded in May 2025 and signed in July 2025 during the Prime Minister’s UK visit; in force since 15 July 2026; covers goods, services, investment and mobility, alongside a Double Contribution Convention exempting short-term workers from paying social security in both countries.
- Trade concepts: Tariff preference; rules of origin; certificate of origin; non-tariff barriers; trade facilitation; preference utilisation.
- Institutions: Ministry of Commerce and Industry; DGFT; Export Promotion Councils; FIEO; the UK India Business Council.
- Other Indian agreements: India–UAE CEPA (2022); India–Australia ECTA (2022); India–EFTA TEPA (signed 2024); negotiations with the EU and the US.
- Bilateral framework: The India–UK Roadmap 2030 and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2021).
- UK context: Post-Brexit “Global Britain”; the Indo-Pacific tilt; devolution to regional mayors and the “Northern Powerhouse” idea; the UK CBAM from 2027.
- Indian policy links: Make in India; PLI schemes; Districts as Export Hubs; the Foreign Trade Policy 2023; the diaspora as an economic and soft-power link.
India Implications
- India’s earlier FTAs have suffered from low utilisation. CETA’s success will be measured not by tariff schedules but by how many Indian firms actually claim its preferences.
- Subnational diplomacy suits India’s federal economy: States have distinct sectoral strengths, and region-to-region links can match them with partners more precisely than national campaigns.
- The shift from market access to R&D, talent and supply chains makes universities and research institutions as important to the agreement as exporters.
- The UK CBAM from 2027 could erode tariff gains for carbon-intensive exports, so carbon accounting must be part of CETA readiness.
- HP AngleThe editorial’s region-to-region logic gives Himachal a concrete opening. Its largest export sector, pharmaceuticals from the Baddi-Barotiwala-Nalagarh belt, already sells into the UK’s large generic-medicines market and stands to gain most from easier market access. Himachal’s apple economy has a direct English connection: the dwarfing Malling rootstocks — M9, MM106 and MM111 — used in the state’s high-density orchards were developed at East Malling in Kent, making horticultural research a natural partnership area. And the North of England’s own Lake District in Cumbria, a mountain landscape built around tourism, offers a partner for Himachal in hill tourism, heritage and conservation, where Shimla’s colonial past is already a shared story. What Himachal’s MSMEs need is what the editorial prescribes: simple guidance on rules of origin and documentation, through the state’s industries department and export promotion councils. For an HPAS answer: a trade agreement helps a State only when its firms, farmers and institutions know how to use it.
Conclusion: CETA’s value depends on how well businesses can use it. Regional engagement and practical tools, like those shown by the North of England delegation, can turn a trade agreement into real trade, investment and partnership.
Q. The India–UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) represents a shift from trade negotiations towards implementation. Discuss the factors that will determine its success.
15 Marks · 250 WordsQ. Examine the role of subnational and region-to-region engagement in deepening India’s economic partnerships, with reference to India–UK relations.
10 Marks · 150 Words