The Hindu
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Daily Current Affairs · Raman Academy, Shimla
Telangana seeks 100% MSP procurement amid drought
Drought conditions prevail in 315 of Telangana’s 621 mandals, and State Agriculture Minister Tummala Nageswara Rao has sought Central relief. He asked for 100% procurement of major crops at MSP, wage employment for farmworkers and wider water-conservation works. With this year’s El Niño weakening the monsoon, the State argues that farmers will only adapt their cropping patterns if they are sure their produce will be bought.
Key Analytical Dimensions
At a virtual meeting chaired by Union Agriculture Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan, Telangana asked the Centre to bring maize, jowar and other major crops under the Price Support Scheme, remove the 25% cap on procurement, and buy 100% at MSP. The Price Support Scheme currently covers pulses, oilseeds and copra, with procurement generally capped at a quarter of production — so the request is both to widen the scheme and to lift its ceiling.
The Minister’s core argument is behavioural: farmers will move away from water-intensive crops towards maize, jowar and millets only if those crops are fully procured. A 25% cap leaves three-quarters of the harvest exposed to market prices, which makes the switch riskier than staying with paddy, whose procurement is assured.
The State wants wage employment and widespread water-conservation works under the Viksit Bharat – Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) programme, more budget for micro-irrigation and inter-cropping seed, and rationalised fertiliser prices and subsidies. A Khet Bachao Abhiyan will run from 22 to 30 October with national agricultural institutions and universities.
Full procurement would raise the food subsidy, storage and disposal burden, and could distort cropping patterns and market prices — the same problem that open-ended paddy and wheat procurement has created in Punjab and Haryana. The policy question is how to give price assurance for the crops India wants grown without creating a new surplus to store.
States bear the immediate cost of drought relief, while the Centre controls procurement norms and NDRF funds. Telangana is also among the States that opposed the new rural employment law, whose 60:40 Centre–State cost sharing raises its own bill — so the demand sits inside a wider debate on cooperative federalism.
Price-Support Instruments Compared
| Instrument | How it works | Crops | Limitation |
|---|---|---|---|
| MSP with open procurement | FCI and State agencies buy at MSP for the central pool | Mainly paddy and wheat | Skews cropping towards water-intensive cereals; large storage costs |
| Price Support Scheme (PM-AASHA) | NAFED and NCCF buy at MSP when market prices fall below it | Pulses, oilseeds and copra | Generally capped at 25% of production |
| Price Deficiency Payment Scheme (PM-AASHA) | Farmers sell in the market and receive the gap between MSP and the market price | Oilseeds | Can depress market prices; needs reliable price data |
| Market Intervention Scheme | Ad hoc procurement of perishables when prices crash | Fruits, vegetables and other perishables | Case by case; not a standing guarantee |
| Telangana’s demand | Add maize and jowar to the Price Support Scheme, remove the 25% cap and procure 100% at MSP during the drought | ||
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Fiscal and storage burden of 100% procurement | Selective expansion of procurement for climate-resilient crops, with price deficiency payments as a cheaper alternative |
| Delayed Central assistance and slow drought assessment | Timely release of NDRF assistance; wide use of the rural employment programme for water conservation |
| Low irrigation efficiency and groundwater stress | Scale up micro-irrigation, drought-tolerant seeds and inter-cropping |
| Limited insurance and credit for small, rain-fed farmers | Strengthen crop insurance and early-warning systems |
| Market distortion from procurement-led crop choices | Farmer-producer organisations, storage and value chains for millets and pulses; balanced fertiliser use through soil health cards |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- MSP: Announced by the Centre on the recommendation of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) for 22 mandated crops, plus the Fair and Remunerative Price for sugarcane; it has no statutory backing.
- PM-AASHA: The Price Support Scheme, the Price Deficiency Payment Scheme and the Market Intervention Scheme; procurement agencies include FCI, NAFED and NCCF.
- Drought: Meteorological, hydrological and agricultural types; declaration follows the Manual for Drought Management (2016, updated 2020); relief comes from the SDRF and NDRF under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
- El Niño: Warming of the central and eastern equatorial Pacific that typically weakens the Indian summer monsoon.
- Rural employment: The VB-G RAM G Act, which replaced MGNREGA and has been in force since July 2026, guarantees up to 125 days of wage work, with costs shared 60:40 between the Centre and States (90:10 for the north-eastern and Himalayan States).
- Constitutional angle: Agriculture is a State subject (Entry 14, State List); trade, commerce, production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs fall in the Concurrent List (Entry 33).
- Related schemes: PMKSY (Per Drop More Crop); PM Fasal Bima Yojana; the National Mission on Natural Farming; the crop diversification programme.
India Implications
- The demand exposes a design flaw in Indian price policy: assured procurement exists for the crops India grows too much of, and not for the ones it wants more of. Diversification will not happen while that asymmetry lasts.
- Price deficiency payments offer a middle path — price assurance without physical procurement and storage — but they need reliable market price data and quick transfers to work.
- Repeated El Niño shocks make drought-proofing a permanent policy need, not an emergency response. Water conservation under the employment guarantee is one of the few instruments that pays a wage now and reduces risk later.
- The cost-sharing dispute over the new employment law shows that drought relief is also a fiscal-federalism question: who pays when the monsoon fails.
- HP AngleHimachal offers a small but telling test of the Telangana argument that farmers change only when procurement is assured. To promote chemical-free farming, the state buys produce from natural-farming growers at its own support prices — ₹60 per kg for naturally grown wheat and ₹90 per kg for raw turmeric in 2025, with a state price for naturally grown maize as well — well above the national MSP. Procurement under Prakritik Kheti Khushhal Kisan Yojana now targets tens of thousands of growers, evidence that targeted price assurance can shift farm practice at modest cost when the volumes are small. Himachal is also on the favourable side of the new employment law: as a Himalayan State it shares costs 90:10, not 60:40, which makes water-harvesting and slope-stabilisation works cheaper for it to fund. And with most of its cultivated land rain-fed, an El Niño year hits Himachal’s maize and wheat directly. For an HPAS answer: Himachal shows that procurement used as a targeted incentive can change what farmers grow, provided it is aimed at specific crops and practices rather than open-ended.
Conclusion: Telangana’s demands show how climate shocks test Centre–State cooperation and MSP policy. A balanced mix of targeted procurement, timely relief and climate-resilient farming can protect farmers in the short term while encouraging crop diversification without straining public finances.
Q. With reference to the constitutional distribution of legislative powers over agriculture and foodstuffs, consider the following statements:
- Agriculture is primarily a State subject under Entry 14 of the State List.
- Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, foodstuffs fall under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List.
- Parliament has no power to legislate on any matter related to agricultural commodities.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is wrong precisely because of statement 2: Entry 33 of the Concurrent List lets Parliament legislate on trade in and supply of foodstuffs, which is the basis of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Agriculture itself (Entry 14, State List) remains with the States, which is why farm policy so often becomes a Centre–State negotiation.
Q. “Minimum Support Price can provide price assurance to farmers, but it cannot independently ensure agricultural diversification.” Discuss.
10 Marks · 150 WordsStudy flags the impact of Internet use on children
An ICSSR-supported study by Bennett University on Internet use among school-going children aged 9 to 14 in Delhi finds high access, heavy use and weak critical digital skills. Anxiety, sleep disturbances and mood changes are the most reported health effects. The study recommends a “collaborative multi-stakeholder framework” and digital literacy for both children and parents, backed by schools.
Key Analytical Dimensions
The study, titled “Empowering Children in the Digital Age”, surveyed over 2,000 children and about 500 parents in 2025. 97.6% of children access the Internet from home, mainly on smartphones, for an average of about 4.5 hours a day. They have strong functional skills but lack critical ones — understanding persuasion, algorithmic influence and exploitation — which gives adults a false impression of how safe they are.
Nearly 47% had talked to unknown people in the past six months, and many played online games with strangers; risks were highest at 12 to 13 years. Some reported cyberbullying and impersonation, but most did not tell parents or teachers about uncomfortable experiences — even though many say they would prefer parents as the channel for reporting.
Children reported loneliness without the Internet, anger when content cannot be found, and difficulty stopping — classic markers of compulsive use. Alongside anxiety and sleep loss, these show that the effects reach emotional and physical wellbeing, not just study time.
Boys use the Internet more and face more exposure to harmful content. Girls’ more restricted access can limit their digital literacy and self-protection skills. Both groups need tailored responses: protection for one, inclusion for the other.
Children also reported gains in information, upskilling, community-building, collaborative learning and creative expression. The policy aim is safe and critical use, not restriction for its own sake. One limitation: an urban Delhi sample may not represent rural or low-income children.
Key Findings and What They Mean
| Finding | Figure or pattern | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Home access | 97.6%, mainly smartphones | Access is near-universal; the gap is in skills and guidance |
| Daily use | About 4.5 hours | Study comes first, then games, videos and chat |
| Contact with strangers | Nearly 47% in six months | Grooming and fraud risk, highest at 12–13 |
| Reporting | Most did not report bad experiences | Abuse and bullying stay hidden |
| Health effects | Anxiety, sleep disturbance, mood changes | Need for school counselling and sleep guidance |
| Skills | High functional skill, weak critical skill — children can use platforms but cannot see how platforms use them | |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Addictive design and algorithmic targeting of children | Enforce DPDP safeguards, age-appropriate design and limits on addictive features |
| Limited digital literacy of parents and teachers | Critical digital and media literacy in the curriculum; teacher training; parent awareness that favours open talk over punishment |
| Weak age verification and enforcement | Platform accountability with a multi-stakeholder model involving government, schools, parents, platforms and civil society |
| Under-reporting of cyberbullying and abuse | Simple, child-friendly reporting channels in schools and on platforms |
| Shortage of school counsellors | Counselling and mental health services, including Tele-MANAS |
| Rural–urban and gender divides | Gender-inclusive access and screen-time guidance |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- ICSSR: The Indian Council of Social Science Research, an autonomous body under the Ministry of Education, set up in 1969.
- Laws: The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 — verifiable parental consent to process data of anyone under 18, and a bar on tracking and targeted advertising aimed at children; the IT Act, 2000 (Section 67B on child sexual abuse material; Section 66A struck down in Shreya Singhal, 2015); the POCSO Act, 2012; the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.
- Institutions and programmes: NCPCR; MeitY; the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (I4C); Cyber Surakshit Bharat; ISEA (Information Security Education and Awareness); PM eVidya; DIKSHA; digital literacy under NEP 2020.
- Constitutional links: Article 21 (life, privacy and mental health); Article 21A (education); Article 39(f) (healthy development of children); Article 45 (early childhood care and education).
- International: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and its General Comment No. 25 on children’s rights in the digital environment; SDGs 3, 4, 5 and 16.2.
- Global parallels: Australia’s under-16 social media restriction; the UK Online Safety Act; the EU Digital Services Act.
- Concepts: Digital divide; digital literacy against critical media literacy; dark patterns; screen addiction.
India Implications
- The findings support the child-protection provisions of the DPDP Act, but show that law alone cannot work without schools, families and platform design pulling in the same direction.
- The reporting gap is the most actionable finding. If children trust parents but do not tell them, the barrier is fear of punishment or loss of the device — which is why the study stresses open conversation over restriction.
- Teaching critical digital skills — how recommendation systems work, how persuasion and grooming operate — belongs in the school curriculum, not only in awareness campaigns.
- The shortage of school counsellors turns a digital problem into an untreated mental health problem. Tele-MANAS and school-based counselling need to reach children directly.
- HP AngleA Delhi sample describes only half of Himachal’s problem. In the state’s towns — Shimla, Solan, Mandi, Dharamshala, Hamirpur — smartphone use among school children looks much like the study’s findings, and contact with strangers online is an added concern in a state fighting a serious drug-abuse problem among its young people. In remote valleys such as Pangi, Dodra Kwar and parts of Kinnaur and Chamba, the problem is the reverse: patchy connectivity, worse in winter, means children lack access to online learning and digital skills. Himachal therefore needs both halves of the study’s prescription — safety and critical literacy in the towns and inclusion in the valleys — and it needs counsellors in a school system where many schools are small and widely spread. The Himachal Pradesh State Commission for Protection of Child Rights and the police’s school cyber-awareness work are natural channels for the reporting mechanisms the study recommends. For an HPAS answer: in Himachal the digital divide and digital harm exist side by side, often within the same district.
Conclusion: Digital technology offers real learning and creative benefits, but unguided use exposes children to compulsive use, strangers and mental health risks. A balanced approach of critical digital literacy, strong data and platform regulation and supportive parenting can empower children to use the Internet safely, in line with Viksit Bharat and the SDGs.
Q. With reference to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), consider the following statements:
- The best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.
- Children have rights relating to protection, development and participation.
- The Convention applies only to children who have not attained the age of 14 years.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 2 are correct. The best-interests principle (Article 3) is one of the Convention’s four general principles, alongside non-discrimination, the right to life and development, and respect for the child’s views. Statement 3 is wrong: the Convention defines a child as anyone below 18 years, unless majority is attained earlier under national law. India ratified it in 1992, and it is the most widely ratified human rights treaty.
Q. Excessive and unsafe Internet use among children presents challenges to their mental health, physical wellbeing and social development. Examine the causes and suggest suitable measures to address these concerns.
10 Marks · 150 WordsA case for joining the global carbon coalition
India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) is now live: nearly 500 companies in seven sectors filed their first compliance reports on 31 July 2026. Meanwhile the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets (OCCCM), launched in May by the EU, China and Brazil, is working to align how compliance carbon markets measure, account and communicate. India has stayed outside so far. The article argues that the bigger risk is being outside the room where the rules are written.
Key Analytical Dimensions
The CCTS sets binding emission-intensity targets with penalties for real entities in sectors such as aluminium, cement, chlor-alkali, pulp and paper, petroleum refining, petrochemicals and textiles. The first credits are due in October, and trading on the power exchanges is expected between November and January. The scheme is designed to deliver India’s NDC targets and the 2070 net-zero goal.
Proposed by Brazil at COP30 in Belém, the OCCCM was formally constituted in Florence on 7 May 2026. Germany and New Zealand joined first, and Canada, France, Norway, Türkiye and the UK followed. It took up its first work plan at Wuhan in mid-September. Its focus is carbon pricing exchange, MRV systems, carbon accounting methods and rules on high-integrity offsets, run through high-level and executive meetings, thematic working groups and a Secretariat.
More than 50 countries now price carbon, and their systems may eventually link. Joining lets India shape MRV, accounting and offset standards instead of reacting to rules set by others — and could, in time, let Indian credits earn revenue by linking with stricter jurisdictions.
The coalition does not enforce mitigation targets and does not mention the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism explicitly. But common MRV and accounting standards would help Indian exporters prove the carbon content of their goods and reduce border-tax exposure. A report under the COP30 President’s independent council has already sketched a CBAM-centred climate coalition with incentives for members and penalties for non-members.
Joining a coalition led by the EU and China could invite pressure over time, and today’s talk of “interoperability” could later constrain domestic policy space. India must protect CBDR-RC and differentiated treatment for the Global South — which is why Brazil’s presence as a founding member and current President offers some comfort.
Three Carbon Instruments India Must Navigate
| Feature | India’s CCTS | OCCCM | EU CBAM |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nature | Domestic compliance market with an offset mechanism | Voluntary coalition of compliance-market jurisdictions | Border charge on imports, linked to the EU carbon price |
| Legal base | Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022 | Terms of Reference signed in Florence, May 2026 | EU regulation; definitive phase from January 2026 |
| Coverage | About 500 entities in seven sectors | Members’ markets; MRV, accounting and offset rules | Steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity, hydrogen |
| Binding targets | Yes — emission-intensity targets with penalties | No | No targets; a charge on embedded emissions |
| India’s position | Implementing | Outside so far | Exposed as an exporter |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| An early-stage CCTS with price discovery still to come | Strengthen BEE, regulators and exchanges; expand sectors gradually |
| Credibility of MRV and data quality, especially for MSMEs | Align CCTS design with international MRV and accounting norms |
| Exporter exposure to CBAM and similar border taxes | Help exporters with carbon accounting; prepare for CBAM negotiations or equivalence |
| Risk that coalition decisions become de facto standards | Join the OCCCM, as an observer first or as a full member with clear red lines on CBDR-RC and policy space |
| Balancing growth with decarbonisation costs | Build joint positions with Brazil and other developing members; explore Article 6 linkages for revenue and technology |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Carbon markets: Compliance markets (mandatory, cap-based or intensity-based) and voluntary markets; carbon pricing as an application of the polluter pays principle.
- Indian legal base: The Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022; the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) as administrator, with the Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme as predecessor; Grid Controller of India as registry; trading on power exchanges under the central regulator. The Green Credit Programme runs separately.
- EU CBAM: A carbon border charge on imports of iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen; the definitive phase began in 2026.
- Paris Agreement: Article 6 on carbon-market cooperation (6.2 bilateral transfers; 6.4 the UN-supervised mechanism); NDCs; India’s net zero by 2070, announced at COP26.
- India’s updated NDC (2022): Reduce the emissions intensity of GDP by 45% by 2030 from 2005 levels; about 50% of installed power capacity from non-fossil sources by 2030.
- Principles and concepts: CBDR-RC; climate clubs (William Nordhaus) — members adopt a common carbon price and penalise non-members; MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification).
India Implications
- India has done the hard part — building a domestic carbon price — and stands to lose influence by staying out of the forum where accounting and MRV rules for such markets are being harmonised.
- For exporters of steel, aluminium and cement, credible MRV is now a trade asset. If Indian measurement is recognised abroad, CBAM payments can be reduced or offset by the carbon price already paid at home.
- With UNFCCC negotiations slow, coalitions outside the Paris framework are gaining weight. India’s choice is between shaping them from inside and facing their standards from outside.
- An observer seat first offers a low-risk route: access to the technical work without commitments, while India tests whether its CBDR-RC concerns are respected.
- HP AngleHimachal is directly inside India’s carbon market. Cement is one of the seven CCTS sectors, and the state hosts major cement plants at Darlaghat, Barmana and Bagga in Solan and Bilaspur, which now face emission-intensity targets and will either earn or buy carbon credits. The state also has early experience of carbon finance at the community level: under the World Bank-supported Mid-Himalayan Watershed Development Project, a reforestation component was registered under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism in 2011, and carbon-credit payments were later passed to participating gram panchayats. That experience — small payments, long verification cycles and heavy dependence on measurement — is exactly why MRV standards matter. With its hydropower base and large forest cover, Himachal stands to benefit if India’s market links abroad and credible offsets earn a premium. For an HPAS answer: carbon-market rules decide both the compliance cost of Himachal’s cement plants and the value of its forests and hydropower.
Conclusion: India has already built its carbon price. Joining the OCCCM would give it a voice in shaping global carbon-market rules and better protection against border carbon measures. Safeguarding developing-country interests from inside the coalition is better than staying outside while others write the standards.
Q. With reference to India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), consider the following statements:
- It was enabled by the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022.
- The Bureau of Energy Efficiency acts as its administrator.
- Participation in it is entirely voluntary, with no compliance obligations on any entity.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is wrong: the CCTS has a compliance mechanism, under which obligated entities in notified sectors must meet emission-intensity targets — earning carbon credit certificates if they beat them and buying certificates if they miss — alongside a voluntary offset mechanism for non-obligated entities. The first compliance reports were filed on 31 July 2026.
Q. What is carbon pricing? Explain how carbon taxes and emissions trading systems can contribute to India’s climate mitigation objectives.
10 Marks · 150 WordsAnalysing female labour in the North Eastern States and the Union Territories
The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2025 shows a clear rise in the Female Labour Force Participation Rate (FLFPR) since 2019-20, sharper in rural areas (33% to 45.9%) than in urban areas (23.3% to 27.7%). A closer look at the north-eastern States and the Union Territories shows that the national average hides large variation, and that the geography of women’s work is changing — but not at a uniform pace.
Key Analytical Dimensions
The analysis uses the Average Annual Percentage Point change (AAPP). The all-India rural AAPP is 2.58 and the urban AAPP 0.88, so rural participation is rising 1.7 points a year faster. AAPP shows speed, not level — which is why the analysis pairs it with each State’s starting point.
In rural areas, Arunachal Pradesh records the highest AAPP at 8.28, more than three times the national figure, while FLFPR declined in Delhi and Lakshadweep (Lakshadweep at −2.34) — a spread of over 10 points. In urban areas Arunachal leads again at 5.24, followed by Meghalaya, Nagaland and Manipur, while Puducherry, Ladakh, Delhi and Lakshadweep record negative AAPP.
Plotting starting level against pace reveals two kinds of progress. Catching up: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and Tripura started below the 2019-20 national level but improved faster. Sustained gains: Nagaland, Meghalaya, Andaman and Nicobar and J&K started above it and still gained faster than average. Delhi started low and fell further behind.
The rural rise comes mainly from agriculture and self-employment, which can include unpaid work in family enterprises. Higher participation is welcome, but whether it reflects aspiration or distress depends on earnings, security and choice — the classic question behind the U-shaped relationship between women’s work and development.
An urban gain of under one point a year points to constraints that rural self-employment does not face: safety, care burdens, transport and the scarcity of formal jobs that suit women’s circumstances. The declines in small UTs may also reflect sampling variation and limited job opportunities.
Pace of Change in Female Labour Force Participation
| Measure | Rural | Urban |
|---|---|---|
| FLFPR, 2019-20 to 2025 | 33% to 45.9% | 23.3% to 27.7% |
| All-India AAPP | 2.58 | 0.88 |
| Highest AAPP | Arunachal Pradesh, 8.28 | Arunachal Pradesh, 5.24 |
| Negative AAPP | Delhi; Lakshadweep (−2.34) | Puducherry, Ladakh, Delhi, Lakshadweep (lowest −1.30) |
| Spread | Over 10 percentage points | From +5.24 to −1.30 |
Baseline and Pace: Four Kinds of Story
| Pattern | Meaning | Examples (rural) |
|---|---|---|
| Low start, fast gain | Catching up | Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Tripura |
| High start, fast gain | Sustained leadership | Nagaland, Meghalaya, Andaman and Nicobar, J&K |
| Low start, slow gain or decline | Falling further behind | Delhi |
| Policy lesson | Averages mislead — State plans should be built on both the level of participation and its pace of change | |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Informal, low-paid or unpaid family work | Quality non-farm jobs in handloom, food processing, tourism and services |
| Care burden and restrictive social norms | Creches, childcare and elder care |
| Urban job scarcity, safety and mobility | Safe transport and workplaces; support for women entrepreneurs |
| Weak infrastructure and skilling in remote areas | Skilling and digital access through SHGs and DAY-NRLM |
| Data limits in small States and UTs | Stronger sex-disaggregated data, including time-use surveys |
| Wage gaps and limited access to credit and land | State-specific policies built on baseline-plus-pace analysis, not national averages |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- PLFS: Launched in 2017 by the National Statistics Office, MoSPI; redesigned from January 2025 to give more frequent rural and urban estimates, with annual reports on a calendar-year basis.
- Indicators: LFPR — share of the population working or seeking or available for work; WPR — share employed; UR — share of the labour force that is unemployed. Usual Status (ps+ss) is the standard reference.
- Constitutional and legal links: Articles 14, 15(3), 16, 39(a) and (d) (livelihood and equal pay) and 42 (maternity relief); the Code on Wages, 2019 (which absorbed the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976) and the Code on Social Security, 2020, in force since November 2025; the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017.
- Schemes: DAY-NRLM and SHGs; Lakhpati Didi; the rural employment guarantee (now VB-G RAM G); PM Mudra Yojana; Stand-Up India; Skill India.
- North East context: Sixth Schedule areas; matrilineal societies (the Khasi and Garo of Meghalaya); community-based agriculture and handloom; the Act East policy; the North Eastern Council.
- Concepts and indices: The U-shaped relationship between female labour participation and development; distress versus aspirational work; the unpaid care economy; the Global Gender Gap Report; SDGs 5 and 8.
India Implications
- The national rise in FLFPR is real, but a single number conceals very different stories. Policy built on averages will miss both the fast risers and the States that are falling behind.
- The north-eastern pattern suggests that social structure matters: societies where women traditionally farm, weave and trade show higher and rising participation, while the urban constraints of safety and care hold back women in the big cities.
- The next step is quality. Turning self-employment and unpaid family work into paid, secure work is the difference between participation and empowerment.
- Time-use surveys and better State-level samples are needed to measure unpaid care work, which remains the largest invisible barrier to women’s paid employment.
- HP AngleHimachal belongs naturally beside the north-eastern States in this analysis. Like them, it is a hill economy where women have always done much of the farm work, and it has long recorded one of the highest female labour force participation rates in India. The same caution applies: a large share of that work is on family-owned farms and orchards, often recorded as self-employment or unpaid family labour, and frequently on land held in men’s names. Women also account for a majority of the person-days on the state’s rural employment works. The policy lessons of the article transfer directly: Himachal’s challenge is not raising participation but raising its quality — through women’s SHGs in apple grading and food processing, homestays and tourism services, and recognition of women as farmers in land and credit records. For an HPAS answer: Himachal shows that high female participation is a starting point, not an end point — the real measure is how much of that work is paid, secure and in women’s own name.
Conclusion: The rise in FLFPR is encouraging, but its uneven geography shows that national averages conceal key differences. Targeted, State-specific action that improves job quality, care support and safety can turn higher participation into genuine economic empowerment.
Q. With reference to the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), consider the following statements:
- It is conducted by the National Statistics Office under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
- The Labour Force Participation Rate includes persons who are working as well as those seeking or available for work.
- The Worker Population Ratio is always higher than the Labour Force Participation Rate.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is the reverse of the truth: the labour force includes both the employed and the unemployed, while the Worker Population Ratio counts only the employed, so WPR can never exceed LFPR. The gap between the two, as a share of the labour force, is the unemployment rate.
Q. Examine the relationship between women’s education, economic empowerment and labour force participation in India.
10 Marks · 150 WordsSeparation of powers and the CJI’s refusal
Chief Justice of India Surya Kant declined a request from the Leaders of the Opposition, Mallikarjun Kharge (Rajya Sabha) and Rahul Gandhi (Lok Sabha), for a meeting about allegations against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar’s conduct during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) and about the detention of protesters in Delhi. The CJI said that meeting on matters already sub judice would violate the separation of powers and judicial propriety. The episode shows how the judiciary protects its impartiality while keeping its judicial doors open.
Key Analytical Dimensions
On 10 October the two leaders sought a meeting to submit a memorandum on the CEC and the Election Commission, hours after a police crackdown on protesters demanding the CEC’s resignation. Gandhi followed with a detailed representation asking that it be treated as a letter petition in the public interest, noting that he sits on the selection committee under Section 7 of the 2023 CEC and EC Act and had recorded a dissent on the CEC’s selection on 17 February 2025. He sought full disclosure of SIR records, an audit of voter deletions by a committee headed by a retired Supreme Court judge, and an interim suspension of the SIR.
The CJI declined because the issues were already before the Court, and said the Court has no administrative powers to deal with them. He advised the leaders to invoke its judicial powers instead and assured them that any petition would be heard at the earliest. Gandhi and other Opposition leaders then filed a writ petition, which has been registered.
A private meeting with one side, while the CJI heads the Bench hearing related cases, would risk an appearance of bias. Disputes must be heard in open court, with opposing parties on equal footing — the practical form of audi alteram partem. Justice must not only be done but be seen to be done.
Senior advocate C.U. Singh noted that the same standard was applied when the One Nation One Election JPC proposed to meet the judges. Applying it to both the Government side and the Opposition is what makes it principled. And because the CJI pointed to the Article 32 route and promised an early hearing, no remedy was denied.
The article recalls episodes that keep the propriety debate alive: the Prime Minister’s 2024 Ganesh Chaturthi visit to then-CJI Chandrachud’s residence; Justices P.N. Bhagwati, M.R. Shah and Arun Mishra publicly praising political leaders; Justice Ranjan Gogoi’s Rajya Sabha nomination after retirement; the January 2018 press conference of four judges; and the 1973 supersession of Justices Shelat, Hegde and Grover after Kesavananda Bharati.
The Sequence of Events
| Step | What happened | Constitutional significance |
|---|---|---|
| Meeting sought (10 October) | Kharge and Gandhi seek to meet the CJI with a memorandum on the CEC and the SIR | An attempt to reach the Court on its administrative side |
| Representation | Gandhi asks that his letter be treated as a public-interest petition | Invokes the letter-petition tradition of Article 32 |
| Refusal | The CJI declines: issues are sub judice; no administrative power; use the judicial route | Separation of powers and judicial propriety |
| Writ petition | Opposition leaders file a writ petition, which is registered | Dispute moves to open court, with the other side heard |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Perceived closeness between the judiciary and the executive | Enforceable ethics rules for judges, including cooling-off periods after retirement |
| No binding code of conduct for judges | Give formal force to the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life |
| Delays in hearing politically sensitive cases | Clear timelines for election-related petitions |
| Public mistrust in the Election Commission | Disclosure, independent audit and transparent appointments for constitutional authorities |
| Balancing access to the Court with institutional distance | Keep political and sensitive matters strictly within open-court proceedings |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Separation of powers: Part of the basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973; Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975). India follows a functional, not rigid, separation (Ram Jawaya Kapur, 1955).
- Related Articles: Article 50 (a Directive Principle: separate the judiciary from the executive); Articles 32 and 226 (writs); Articles 124 and 217 (appointment of judges); Article 324 (Election Commission); Article 142 (complete justice).
- Sub judice rule: Matters pending before a court should not be discussed in a way that could influence it.
- Natural justice: Audi alteram partem (hear the other side) and nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause).
- Codes of conduct: The Supreme Court’s Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997); the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) — independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, and competence and diligence.
- Appointments: The collegium system (the Three Judges Cases); the NJAC struck down in 2015 (the Fourth Judges Case).
- PIL and letter petitions: Liberalised standing under Article 32 (S.P. Gupta, 1981); a letter treated as a writ petition (Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, 1980); Hussainara Khatoon (1979), an early PIL on undertrial prisoners.
India Implications
- The refusal reaffirms that the Supreme Court’s power lies in adjudication, not in administrative intervention. A court that meets litigants privately weakens the very authority it would later exercise in open court.
- That the Leaders of the Opposition approached the CJI directly signals low trust in the Election Commission — a concern in its own right for a body whose legitimacy rests on being trusted by all sides.
- India still lacks an enforceable code of conduct for judges. Repeated controversies over proximity to politicians show why voluntary norms are no longer enough.
- The episode is a model answer to the question of how separation of powers works in practice: functional separation, open-court process and access to remedies all held together.
- HP AngleHimachal’s recent political history shows the same principle at work: political disputes in the state have been settled on the judicial side, in open court. In February 2024, after six Congress MLAs cross-voted in the Rajya Sabha election, the Speaker disqualified them under the Tenth Schedule for defying the party whip on the Budget vote, and the dispute went to the Supreme Court through formal petitions. In November 2024, the Himachal Pradesh High Court struck down the Himachal Pradesh Parliamentary Secretaries Act, 2006, under which MLAs had been appointed Chief Parliamentary Secretaries, holding that the State legislature lacked the competence to create such posts; the State appealed, and the Supreme Court stayed the part of the order directing disqualification proceedings. In both cases politicians who disagreed with the outcome used petitions and appeals, not private approaches. For an HPAS answer: Himachal’s CPS and disqualification cases show that separation of powers is preserved when every side takes its grievance to the courtroom rather than to the judge.
Conclusion: The CJI’s refusal reaffirms that justice must be seen to be done in open court, not in private audiences. Preserving separation of powers and judicial propriety, while keeping judicial remedies accessible, protects both the independence of the judiciary and citizens’ faith in it.
Q. With reference to the separation of powers in India, consider the following statements:
- Article 50, a Directive Principle, directs the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State.
- The Supreme Court has held separation of powers to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
- The Constitution of India provides for a rigid separation of powers on the American model.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is wrong: India follows a functional separation with checks and balances, not a rigid one. Ministers sit in the legislature, the executive makes delegated legislation, and the courts review both — as Ram Jawaya Kapur (1955) recognised. What is protected as basic structure is the separation of essential functions, not a watertight division of personnel.
Q. The doctrine of separation of powers is a fundamental feature of the Indian constitutional framework, but it does not imply a complete separation of functions. Discuss.
10 Marks · 150 WordsDeveloping minds in a digital world, a changing India
Context
India’s young population — about 65 crore people under 25 — is growing up in a digital environment that shapes brain development, attention, emotion and learning. The editorial argues that technology brings real benefits, but that constant exposure to engagement-driven platforms and generative AI during the years of brain maturation is a largely uncontrolled experiment. It calls for guidance, accountability and protected “productive struggle” in learning, without rejecting technology.
Key Analytical Dimensions
The prefrontal cortex — which governs attention, working memory, planning and impulse control — keeps maturing into early adulthood. Research links heavy screen time to changes in brain structure and connectivity, though this does not prove causation. The author therefore argues for a precautionary approach rather than waiting for definitive proof of harm.
Short videos, autoplay, infinite scroll, algorithmic recommendations and social feedback create variable reinforcement loops that encourage repetitive checking and rapid shifts of attention. Companies have strong financial incentives to keep young users engaged, while the developmental risks fall on children and families — an accountability gap.
Generative AI can supplant, not just assist, mental effort. Cognitive offloading is not harmful in itself — calculators and notes are offloading too — but replacing the effort that learning requires is. Learning happens through struggle: finding the words, making mistakes and revising, which AI shortcuts can remove.
Constant stimulation leaves little idle time, and idle time is where imagination, reflection and creativity develop. The editorial treats boredom not as a problem to be solved by a screen but as a space that young minds need.
Young people also show strong skills in filtering information and navigating digital spaces. The aim is not to reject technology but to make sure screens and AI do not crowd out the stimulation, silence, reflection and struggle through which minds develop.
Shared Responsibility: Who Does What
| Actor | Recommended action | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Parents | Device-free times and places, protected study periods, healthy sleep and unstructured time | Protect attention, sleep and idle time |
| Schools | Oral exams, supervised writing and applied problem-solving | Preserve productive struggle in learning and assessment |
| Platforms | Disclose and test evidence of effects on children; age-appropriate design; limits on addictive features | Close the accountability gap |
| Policymakers | Demand evidence from companies; fund independent research through ICSSR, ICMR and universities | Build an Indian evidence base |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Addictive design and weak regulation of products for young users | Require platforms to disclose and test child-impact evidence, with age-appropriate design |
| Limited independent Indian research | Fund independent research through ICSSR, ICMR and universities |
| Low digital and AI literacy among parents and teachers | Teach critical digital and AI literacy; evidence-based parental guidance on screen-free routines and sleep |
| AI-assisted assignments weakening assessment | Redesign assessment around oral exams, supervised writing and applied problem-solving |
| Shortage of child psychologists and counsellors | Strengthen school mental health services |
| Rural–urban and gender divides | Encourage unstructured play, sports, reading and offline social time for all children |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Concepts: Neuroplasticity (the brain’s capacity to adapt to experience, strongest in early life); cognitive offloading; variable reinforcement (unpredictable rewards that strongly sustain behaviour, from B.F. Skinner’s behavioural psychology); dark patterns.
- Laws and programmes: The DPDP Act, 2023 (verifiable parental consent; no tracking or targeted advertising aimed at children); the IT Act, 2000 and the IT Rules, 2021; NEP 2020; DIKSHA; PM eVidya; Tele-MANAS and Manodarpan for mental health support; the POCSO Act, 2012.
- Constitutional links: Article 21 (life, dignity and mental health); Article 21A (education); Article 39(f) (healthy development of children); Article 51A(k) (duty of parents to provide educational opportunities to children aged 6 to 14).
- Global parallels: Australia’s under-16 social media restriction; the UK Online Safety Act; the EU Digital Services Act; the UNCRC General Comment No. 25.
- Demographic dividend: India’s young population is an asset only if the quality of its human capital — health, attention, learning and skills — keeps pace.
India Implications
- India’s demographic dividend is an argument about human capital, not headcount. If attention, reasoning and learning are weakened during development, the dividend shrinks no matter how large the young population.
- Assessment design is the front line. If homework and take-home assignments can be completed by AI, schools and examining bodies must shift weight to supervised writing, oral examination and applied problems.
- The DPDP Act’s child protections address data, not design. A next step would be age-appropriate design obligations on platforms, backed by Indian evidence.
- The editorial and today’s ICSSR study point the same way: India needs its own research on how digital life affects its children, rather than borrowing conclusions from other countries.
- HP AngleThe editorial’s idea of “productive struggle” has a direct meaning for Himachal’s competitive-exam aspirants. Descriptive papers such as the HPAS Mains reward exactly the skills the editorial says AI can erode — structuring an argument under time pressure, recalling facts without a prompt, and writing clearly by hand in an examination hall. An aspirant who lets an AI tool draft model answers may feel prepared but has skipped the struggle through which the skill is built; the examination will not allow the shortcut. For the state’s schools, the editorial’s prescriptions fit naturally into existing structures: HP Board of School Education assessment can give more weight to supervised writing and orals, and residential and day-boarding schools can build device-free study hours into their routines. For an HPAS answer — and for preparing one — the lesson is the same: AI can help you check your work, but it cannot do the practice for you.
Conclusion: India cannot and should not shut out digital technology, but it must ensure that screens and AI do not crowd out the stimulation, silence, reflection and struggle through which young minds develop. A precautionary, evidence-based approach, shared by families, schools, regulators and companies, can turn the demographic dividend into capable, thoughtful citizens.
Q. “The rapid expansion of digital technology has created new opportunities as well as challenges for the social and cognitive development of children.” Discuss.
15 Marks · 250 WordsQ. Examine how generative AI challenges existing methods of learning and assessment in Indian schools, and suggest reforms that preserve “productive struggle” in education.
10 Marks · 150 Words