The Hindu – Important News Articles & Editorial
Today’s coverage: the case for a stopgap renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty, India and Egypt’s first step towards a trade pact, why green law needs baselines, rebalancing India’s rice economy, the privacy-versus-press-freedom challenge to the DPDP Act, and an editorial on the PM’s visit to Manila and the Act East Policy.
India and Bangladesh should support temporary renewal of Ganga Water Treaty: expert
The 30-year Ganga Water Treaty expires in December. Manjur Ahmed Chowdhury, former Chairman of Bangladesh’s National River Conservation Commission, says a full revision is not possible in the four weeks left, and suggests a three-to-five-year renewal as a stopgap, subject to clearance by the political leadership of both countries. This is one expert’s view, not an official position.
Key Facts
- Expert’s argument: river treaties take far longer than four weeks to finalise; “a bad treaty is better than no treaty”; a three-to-five-year renewal is possible “at the last moment” with political approval on both sides.
- Risk window: the February agricultural season, when Bangladesh’s dependence on Ganga water rises. Without a treaty, India has no commitment to release water at regular intervals, which could affect Bangladesh’s agriculture, economy and ecology.
- History: between 1988 and 1996, Bangladesh faced unpredictable Ganga flows; the treaty brought predictability.
| Flow at Farakka | India’s share | Bangladesh’s share |
|---|---|---|
| 70,000 cusecs or less | 50% | 50% |
| 70,000–75,000 cusecs | The balance | 35,000 cusecs |
| 75,000 cusecs or more | 40,000 cusecs | The balance |
| 11 March – 10 May | Each country is guaranteed 35,000 cusecs in alternate three ten-day periods | |
| Below 50,000 cusecs | The two governments enter immediate consultations | |
Static Dimensions
- Treaty: signed on 12 December 1996 by Prime Ministers H.D. Deve Gowda and Sheikh Hasina for 30 years; Article XII allows renewal by mutual consent.
- Farakka Barrage: commissioned in 1975, mainly to divert water to keep Kolkata Port navigable.
- Earlier arrangements: the 1977 Farakka Agreement (which guaranteed Bangladesh at least 80% of its share in lean flows) and MoUs in 1982 and 1985. The Teesta agreement (2011) remains unsigned.
- Institutions: Joint Rivers Commission (1972) and a Joint Committee that monitors flows at Farakka. The two countries share 54 rivers.
- International law: equitable and reasonable utilisation and the no-significant-harm principle in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention (India is not a party).
Analysis
- Predictability is the treaty’s value: regular releases support irrigation, drinking water, fisheries and the salinity balance of the Sundarbans in Bangladesh.
- Time constraint: a new treaty needs fresh data on flows, climate change, upstream use and basin demand; a short renewal buys time without a legal vacuum.
- India’s interests: Kolkata Port’s navigability (the original reason for Farakka), irrigation in Bihar and West Bengal, and rising domestic demand.
- Dated numbers: glacier-fed variability, siltation and upstream withdrawals make the 1996 figures outdated.
- Diplomatic value: water cooperation shapes wider ties in trade, connectivity and energy; a lapse could erode trust.
- Caution: the expert’s timeline is an opinion; the formal positions of both governments are not stated.
Challenges
- Very little time, and no agreed updated data.
- Disagreement over the sharing formula; the Teesta deadlock.
- Climate-driven variability in flows.
- State-level concerns in India.
- Ecological needs of the Sundarbans and environmental flows.
Way Forward
- Extend the treaty for three to five years while negotiating a revised version.
- A joint scientific study of flows, sedimentation and climate impact.
- Include environmental flows, early flood warning and data sharing.
- Basin-wide cooperation on the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna system, with an empowered Joint Rivers Commission.
- Involve border States to build domestic consensus.
India Implications
- Neighbourhood ties: water is one of the most sensitive issues with Bangladesh; continuity builds trust.
- Federal dimension: any revision needs the support of West Bengal and Bihar.
- Consistency: India is upstream on the Ganga and the Indus and downstream on the Brahmaputra, so its stance on one treaty affects its case on others.
Consider the following statements:
- The Baglihar Power Project had been constructed within the parameters of the Indus Waters Treaty.
- The project was completely built by the Union Government with loans from Japan and the World Bank.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- (a) 1 only
- (b) 2 only
- (c) Both 1 and 2
- (d) Neither 1 nor 2
Click to reveal answer
Discuss the strategic and economic significance of the Ganga Water Treaty, 1996, for India-Bangladesh relations. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
India and Egypt to work on terms of reference for potential trade pact: Goyal
At the Joint Trade Committee meeting in Cairo, India and Egypt agreed to work on terms of reference (ToR) for a potential bilateral trade agreement. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal also stressed local-currency trade, fintech links and cultural cooperation. The step positions Egypt as India’s gateway to Africa and West Asia.
Key Facts
- ToR work: a Commerce Ministry team led by Joint Secretary Petal Dhillon will work with the Egyptian side in a time-bound manner. ToR set the broad contours for formally negotiating a trade agreement; a working group will decide them.
- Trade size: bilateral trade is $6.5 billion; Mr. Goyal said India needs to be “much more ambitious”.
- Local currencies: the two central banks are working to promote local-currency trade to lower the cost of doing business.
- Fintech: a proposal to link India’s UPI with Egyptian payment systems.
- Sectors: pharmaceuticals and healthcare, engineering and automotive, agriculture, digitisation and fintech, and museums.
- Culture: the Yuge Yugeen Bharat Museum is being developed at the North and South Block complex, New Delhi.
- Egypt was represented by its Minister of Investments and Foreign Trade, Mohamed Farid Saleh.
| Type | Coverage |
|---|---|
| Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) | Limited tariff preferences on selected goods |
| Free Trade Agreement (FTA) | Tariff cuts on substantially all trade in goods |
| CEPA / CECA | Goods plus services, investment and IPR |
| Step | What happens |
|---|---|
| 1. Joint Study Group | Assesses feasibility and gains |
| 2. Terms of reference | Sets scope and modalities – the stage India and Egypt have now reached |
| 3. Negotiations | Rounds on tariffs, rules of origin, services and other chapters |
| 4. Signing and ratification | Agreement concluded and brought into force |
Static Dimensions
- India-Egypt ties: Strategic Partnership (2023); Egypt joined BRICS in 2024. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, a vital route for India’s trade with Europe, and India has investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone.
- Egypt’s trade links: member of COMESA, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the Agadir Agreement, with an association agreement with the EU – a platform for Indian re-exports.
- Rupee internationalisation: the RBI’s July 2022 framework for INR settlement (Vostro accounts); local-currency arrangements with several countries; UPI links with countries such as the UAE, Singapore, Nepal, Bhutan and France.
- Soft power: heritage cooperation; the Grand Egyptian Museum opened in 2025.
Analysis
- Scale gap: $6.5 billion is small relative to both economies, leaving room to grow.
- Gateway logic: Egypt’s access to Africa, the EU and Gulf markets makes it a manufacturing and logistics hub for Indian pharmaceuticals, auto parts and engineering goods.
- Local-currency trade: settling in rupees and Egyptian pounds cuts dollar dependence and conversion costs, but faces low liquidity and the problem of surplus balances from trade imbalances.
- Payments connectivity: a UPI link can ease remittances, tourism and small trade, and spreads India’s digital public infrastructure.
- Early stage: ToR do not guarantee an agreement; sensitive items, rules of origin and services access will decide the outcome.
- Strategic fit: supports India’s search for new markets amid global trade uncertainty.
Challenges
- Non-tariff barriers and regulatory differences.
- Payment-system compatibility and balancing local-currency accounts.
- Egypt’s economic constraints, including foreign-exchange pressure.
- Competition from other suppliers in Egypt’s market.
Way Forward
- Finalise ToR on a fixed timeline with negotiation milestones.
- Pilot the UPI link and local-currency settlement; build rupee-pound liquidity.
- Target complementary sectors: pharma, autos, agri-processing, fintech.
- Use the Suez Canal Economic Zone and Indian industrial parks for investment.
- Promote people-to-people and cultural exchanges.
India Implications
- Market diversification: Egypt opens routes to African, Arab and European markets.
- Strategic location: closer ties around the Suez Canal secure a key trade artery.
- Digital diplomacy: UPI links extend India’s digital public infrastructure abroad.
Which of the following is the most appropriate sequence in the usual process of negotiating a bilateral trade agreement?
- (a) Signing → ToR → Negotiations → Ratification
- (b) ToR → Ratification → Joint Study Group → Signing
- (c) Negotiations → Signing → ToR → Ratification
- (d) Joint Study Group → ToR → Negotiations → Signing and ratification
Click to reveal answer
Examine the strategic and economic significance of Egypt in India’s foreign policy towards Africa and West Asia. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
India’s green law needs baselines, not snapshots
On 22 August, the Supreme Court set aside the National Green Tribunal’s (NGT) December 2017 judgment that had held the organisers of the 2016 World Culture Festival liable for damage to the Yamuna floodplain, and ordered the ₹5 crore deposit to be refunded. The author, a practising advocate, accepts that liability needs attribution, but argues that the Court’s reasoning on uncertainty is weak and that India needs recorded baselines before land is handed over. This is an advocate’s critique, so its points are best used as arguments, not settled law.
Key Facts
- Event: the festival ran from 11 to 13 March 2016 on 25 hectares of active floodplain upstream of the DND flyway, on land allotted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). The appellant was Vyakti Vikas Kendra India.
- NGT process: on 9 March 2016, the NGT allowed the event subject to a ₹5 crore deposit and restoration costs if damage was later found. Its interim order said the floodplain had been “drastically tampered with” but gave no reasons, and reasons never followed.
- Prior condition: an April 2014 expert report described the floodplain as ruined; a July 2015 NGT order noted restoration directions had not been implemented; the organisers reported construction debris over 25–30 acres in December 2015.
- Conflicting committees: the first committee said it could not assess the pre-event condition, yet recommended a full ecological upgrade, including a biodiversity park that had never existed, and the NGT ordered it. A second committee (2017) found grass, standing water, no debris, no significant wetland and no compaction.
- Author’s critique: the “no wetland” finding is circular, since levelling would also leave no wetland; the Court had earlier treated satellite images as unreliable; compaction findings disclosed no method; contracts, bills and machinery logs for ramps, roads and pontoon bridges were never sought; and Section 17(2) of the NGT Act on apportioning liability was reproduced but not applied.
- Remedy proposed: a baseline survey when land is handed over, signed by both parties, and approximate damages where the earlier condition cannot be proved – as the ICJ did in its 2018 Costa Rica-Nicaragua wetland compensation award.
| Date | Development |
|---|---|
| April 2014 | Expert report describes the floodplain as already ruined |
| July 2015 | NGT notes its restoration directions have not been implemented |
| 9 March 2016 | NGT allows the festival on a ₹5 crore deposit |
| 11–13 March 2016 | World Culture Festival held |
| December 2017 | NGT holds the organisers liable for damage |
| 22 August 2026 | Supreme Court sets aside the NGT judgment and orders a refund |
Static Dimensions
- Polluter pays principle: the polluter bears the cost of restoring damage; developed in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (1996) and Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum (1996). Related doctrines: precautionary principle, sustainable development, absolute liability (M.C. Mehta, 1987) and the public trust doctrine (M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 1997).
- Burden of proof: in A.P. Pollution Control Board v. M.V. Nayudu (1999), the Court held that under the precautionary principle the developer must prove an activity is environmentally benign.
- NGT Act, 2010: Section 14 (environmental disputes), Section 15 (relief, compensation and restoration), Section 17 (liability, including apportionment), Section 22 (appeal to the Supreme Court). Constitutional basis: Articles 21, 48A and 51A(g).
- Baseline: the pre-activity condition against which impact is measured, as in EIA baseline data and natural resource damage assessment.
- Floodplains: absorb floodwater and recharge groundwater; their protection links to wetland rules and river-regulation zones.
Analysis
- Attribution is essential: polluter pays needs an identifiable polluter; holding an occupier liable for all historic damage would be arbitrary.
- Uncertainty cuts both ways: if earlier damage is unrecorded and later damage cannot be separated, the polluter escapes – the “degraded commons” problem, where the worse a site already is, the safer it is to degrade further.
- Tension with precaution: if the burden lies on the developer, as in Nayudu, unproven harm should not simply mean acquittal; the author says this tension was not addressed.
- NGT’s process failures: conditions without reasons, a self-contradicting committee and an “upgrade” order beyond the power to restore weakened its findings.
- Evidence quality: photographs and site visits are snapshots; technical questions like compaction need engineering measurement and the developer’s own records.
- Public authority’s role: the DDA allotted already-degraded land without a survey – regulatory accountability matters as much as the organisers’ liability.
- Delay: a decade of litigation, during which the original complainant died, shows how slow justice weakens environmental remedies.
- Caution: the author’s reading of the judgment is contestable; the Court’s central finding was that the NGT never answered whether additional damage was caused.
Challenges
- No pre-event baseline data for public land.
- Reliance on committees with conflicting or interested members.
- Limits of the NGT’s remedial power and procedural weaknesses.
- Delay, and difficulty apportioning damage among several actors.
Way Forward
- Mandatory baseline surveys when floodplain or similar public land is allotted – levels, soil density, vegetation, water bodies and dated photographs, signed by both sides, at the applicant’s cost.
- Apply Section 17(2) apportionment where harm is cumulative; use approximate damages where the earlier condition is unprovable.
- Require reasoned interim orders and independent expert committees.
- Seek contracts, machinery logs and fill bills from developers.
- Strengthen floodplain zoning and track restoration orders to completion.
India Implications
- Environmental justice: without baselines, polluter pays becomes hard to enforce on already-degraded land.
- Tribunal credibility: reasoned, evidence-based orders are needed for findings to survive appeal.
- Urban rivers: floodplains of the Yamuna and other city rivers face constant pressure from events and construction.
The term ‘environmental baseline data’, often used in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), refers to:
- (a) The projected environmental condition after completion of a project
- (b) The financial cost of environmental compensation
- (c) The pre-project environmental condition against which subsequent impacts are assessed
- (d) The maximum permissible level of pollution prescribed by regulators
Click to reveal answer
What is environmental baseline data? Examine its importance in assessing ecological damage and determining liability in cases involving public land. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
Rebalancing India’s rice economy
India is the world’s largest rice exporter, but much of its rice is grown with scarce groundwater and carries a climate cost. The authors – an ecological economist and an IRRI scientist – argue that rice policy should shift from volume to value, and that exports should be judged by the water and carbon embedded in each tonne, not only by tonnes shipped and foreign exchange earned.
Key Facts
- Output: an estimated 154.02 million tonnes of rice in 2025-26. Leading producers include Uttar Pradesh, Telangana, West Bengal, Punjab, Chhattisgarh and Odisha.
- Exports: the world’s largest exporter since 2012, with about 30–35% of global rice exports. Exports rose from 17.73 million tonnes ($8.82 billion) in 2020-21 to 21.57 million tonnes ($11.54 billion) in 2025-26.
- Hidden cost: exports carry “virtual water”. Green water (rainfall) strains local resources little; blue water (aquifers, rivers, reservoirs) draws down a shrinking stock. Pressure is greatest in Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh.
- Climate: flooded fields emit methane, and excess nitrogen fertiliser adds other greenhouse gases. Alternate wetting and drying (AWD), direct-seeded rice (DSR) and integrated nutrient management can cut emissions and water use, but results vary with soil and climate.
- Proposed metric: a water-carbon-value framework tracking export value per tonne and per cubic metre of blue water, groundwater use per tonne, irrigation water productivity, emissions per kg, farmer income per unit of water, and groundwater trends in major rice districts.
| Segment | Volume | Value | Value per tonne* | Six-year average |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Basmati | 6.52 million tonnes | ₹50,138 crore ($5.67 billion) | About $870 | 5.16 million tonnes ($4.97 billion) |
| Non-Basmati | 15.04 million tonnes | ₹51,892 crore ($5.86 billion) | About $390 | 14.74 million tonnes ($5.71 billion) |
*Computed from the volume and value figures above. Non-Basmati ships more than twice the volume but earns only marginally more in total.
Static Dimensions
- Virtual water and water footprint: water used to produce a good, traded implicitly when the good is exported; classified as green, blue and grey water.
- Policy drivers: Minimum Support Price with assured FCI procurement, subsidised or free power for irrigation, and fertiliser subsidies. Punjab’s Preservation of Subsoil Water Act, 2009 delays paddy transplanting to save groundwater.
- Related schemes: PMKSY (“Per Drop More Crop”), Atal Bhujal Yojana, National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture and crop diversification programmes.
- Trade institutions: APEDA (Commerce Ministry) promotes agri-exports; a GI tag protects Basmati. India has used export curbs on non-Basmati rice to manage domestic prices and food security.
- Climate links: methane is a potent short-lived greenhouse gas; India is not a signatory to the Global Methane Pledge. Practices such as SRI, AWD and DSR are promoted by research bodies including IRRI.
Analysis
- Value, not volume: non-Basmati earns far less per tonne but takes most of the volume and much of the blue water. A shift towards quality, branding and traceability raises income without raising water use.
- Resource accounting: counting only tonnes and dollars hides depletion; a water-carbon-value framework makes trade-offs visible, as in natural capital accounting.
- Incentive distortions: MSP and free power encourage rice in water-scarce regions, so advice to diversify competes with a guaranteed price.
- Regional logic: rainfed eastern and coastal States use more green water; aligning production with agro-climatic conditions can protect north-western groundwater while keeping national supply.
- Climate co-benefits: AWD and DSR can cut both water and methane, but results are context-specific, so overstating mitigation would be a mistake.
- Market opportunity: certified low-water, low-carbon rice could win premium markets and prepare for future sustainability standards.
- Food security: rice also supplies the public distribution system, so any shift must protect domestic supply and farm incomes – a point the authors do not address in detail.
Challenges
- Assured MSP procurement and power subsidies locking farmers into paddy.
- Falling groundwater in the north-west and rising stress elsewhere.
- No district-level data on water and emissions per tonne.
- Farmer risk and weak extension support for alternatives.
- Competition from low-cost exporters and volatile trade policy.
Way Forward
- Adopt the water-carbon-value framework and publish district-level indicators.
- Realign incentives: crop-diversification support, outcome-based payments and power-subsidy reform with metering.
- Scale AWD, DSR and nutrient management through local trials and extension.
- Promote value addition: GI branding, traceability, processing and speciality rice.
- Encourage rainfed, lower-water regions and shorter-duration varieties.
- Link carbon and water credits to farmer incomes.
India Implications
- Water security: exporting groundwater-intensive rice depletes aquifers in the north-west.
- Climate commitments: methane from paddy is a growing part of India’s emissions debate.
- Farm incomes: premium, traceable rice can raise earnings per drop of water.
The term ‘virtual water trade’, frequently used in discussions on agricultural exports, refers to:
- (a) The physical transportation of freshwater from one country to another
- (b) The transfer of water rights through international agreements
- (c) The water used in producing goods that are subsequently traded
- (d) The export of treated wastewater for industrial purposes
Click to reveal answer
Explain how conventional rice cultivation contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. Briefly discuss the role of Alternate Wetting and Drying and Direct-Seeded Rice in reducing its environmental footprint. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
Privacy vs press freedom: where should the line be drawn?
The Digital News Publishers Association (DNPA), representing 21 publishers, has asked the Supreme Court for an interim stay on provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023. It argues that the Act has no specific journalistic exemption and could hamper investigative journalism, expose sources and deter whistleblowers. The case tests the balance between the right to privacy (Article 21) and press freedom under Article 19(1)(a). The matter is before the Court, so the points below describe arguments and precedent, not a verdict.
Key Facts
- Petition: filed on 6 October, with an interim stay sought on 27 October; listed for further hearing on Tuesday.
- DNPA’s arguments: the Act may impede investigative reporting, force removal of published reports, expose confidential sources and deter whistleblowers. Senior counsel Madhavi Divan said requiring consent from the subjects of reports would create “a complete regime of pre-censorship”.
- Global practice: in Axel Springer v. Germany (2012), the European Court of Human Rights called the press a public watchdog; the U.S. has the First Amendment and the Privacy Protection Act, 1980; the U.K.’s Data Protection Act, 2018 exempts publication reasonably believed to be in the public interest; Brazil excludes journalistic processing; Kenya gives a conditional exemption (Section 52 of its 2019 Act).
- International law: Articles 17 and 19 of the ICCPR, and Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, protect both privacy and expression.
| Case | Year | Principle |
|---|---|---|
| K.S. Puttaswamy | 2017 | Privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21 |
| R. Rajagopal | 1994 | Public officials cannot claim privacy over official acts; no prior restraint by the State on privacy grounds |
| Sahara v. SEBI | 2012 | Courts may postpone reporting if publicity poses a real and substantial risk to a fair trial |
| Manu Sharma | 2010 | Warning against media trials |
| R.K. Anand | 2009 | Upheld a sting that exposed an attempt to suborn a witness |
| Rajat Prasad v. CBI | 2014 | Public interest gives no blanket immunity for unlawful acts during a sting |
Static Dimensions
- DPDP Act, 2023: applies to digital personal data; based on consent and “legitimate uses”; defines the Data Principal (individual) and Data Fiduciary (entity processing data). The Data Protection Board of India adjudicates, with penalties up to ₹250 crore. It has exemptions for certain State functions and research but, unlike earlier drafts and many foreign laws, no specific journalistic exemption.
- RTI link: the Act amended Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, widening the exemption for personal information held by public authorities.
- Constitutional framework: Article 19(1)(a) with reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2); Article 21; the proportionality test from Puttaswamy (legality, legitimate aim, proportionality).
- Press freedom: not separately listed in Article 19 but read into free speech (Romesh Thappar, 1950; Indian Express Newspapers, 1985). The Press Council of India is the press ethics body.
Analysis
- Two rights, one balance: privacy protects dignity against intrusion; press freedom enables public scrutiny. Neither is absolute, and courts use proportionality and a public-interest test.
- Consent and reporting: requiring consent from the subject of an exposé defeats investigation and exposes sources – hence the “pre-censorship” concern. A blanket exemption, however, could let the “journalism” label justify intrusion, so conditions are needed.
- Judicial pattern: Rajagopal protects reporting on public conduct, Sahara and Manu Sharma limit trial by media, and Rajat Prasad denies immunity for illegality – conditional protection, not immunity.
- Comparative lesson: the U.K., Kenya and Brazil show a conditional or full exemption tied to public interest is workable.
- Chilling effect: even rare use of takedown demands or Board proceedings may cause self-censorship, weakening the public’s right to know.
- State interest: data protection is a legitimate aim given rising misuse; the question is whether the means are proportionate.
Challenges
- Defining “journalistic purpose” and “public interest” without excluding citizen journalists or enabling misuse.
- Preventing media trials and abuse of stings.
- Protecting sources and whistleblowers.
- Ensuring an independent, predictable Data Protection Board.
Way Forward
- A conditional journalistic exemption tied to public interest, reasonable belief and ethical codes, with safeguards against misuse.
- Statutory shield provisions to protect sources.
- Prior notice and a hearing for publishers before takedown orders.
- Clarify how the DPDP Act and the RTI Act interact.
- Encourage self-regulation and press ethics, with proportionality-based review.
India Implications
- Democratic accountability: investigative journalism depends on handling personal data without the subject’s consent.
- Right to information: the RTI amendment and consent rules together could narrow public scrutiny of officials.
- Data protection: the case will shape how India balances its new privacy regime with free speech.
With reference to the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023, consider the following statements:
- It regulates the processing of digital personal data.
- It recognises the concepts of Data Principal and Data Fiduciary.
- It provides for the establishment of a Data Protection Board of India.
- It contains a specific, comprehensive exemption for all journalistic activities.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
- (a) 1 and 2 only
- (b) 1, 2 and 3 only
- (c) 2, 3 and 4 only
- (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4
Click to reveal answer
“Privacy and press freedom are not rivals but twin pillars of democracy.” Discuss with reference to the challenge to the DPDP Act, 2023. (10 Marks, 150 Words)
Editorial: PM in Manila – giving new momentum to Act East Policy
The Prime Minister is attending the ASEAN-India Summit and the 21st East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila on 16–17 November. The editorial, by a former Ambassador to ASEAN, argues that the summits can reaffirm ASEAN centrality, consolidate the 2026 ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation and add momentum to the Act East Policy at a time of strategic rivalry and uncertainty in the international order.
Key Facts
- Milestones ahead: in 2027, the ASEAN-India Dialogue Partnership turns 35 and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership turns 5; the ASEAN-India Plan of Action 2026–2030 is the framework.
- Maritime cooperation (2026): the second ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise; MILAN 2026, the International Fleet Review and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in Visakhapatnam; maritime security conferences in Visakhapatnam and Kochi. Focus areas include maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, protection of submarine cables, and HADR. Six ASEAN countries are associated with the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR).
- Economy: bilateral trade last year was about $128 billion. The review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) is incomplete, with disputes over market access, rules of origin and non-tariff barriers. Indian exports to ASEAN rose 56% this year, mainly due to petroleum products.
- Digital: ASEAN sees India’s digital public infrastructure and fintech as complementary; Project Nexus aims to link national instant-payment systems; the ASEAN-India Scale Hub in Bali (July 2026) promoted start-up and investor ties.
- India’s position: a Quad member with close ties to Russia, reinvigorated ties with China despite border differences, and expanding ties with Japan, Australia, Europe and the U.S.; a Quad leaders’ meeting is possible in Manila.
- BRICS link: at this year’s BRICS Summit in New Delhi, Indonesia took part as a member, and Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam as partners.
- People-to-people: direct flights, Nalanda University attracting ASEAN students, and cooperation in healthcare, renewable energy and skills.
| Year | Milestone |
|---|---|
| 1992 | Look East Policy; India becomes a Sectoral Dialogue Partner |
| 1996 | Full Dialogue Partner |
| 2002 | Summit-level partner |
| 2010 | ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement in force |
| 2012 | Strategic Partnership |
| 2014 | Look East becomes Act East |
| 2015 | Services and investment agreements |
| 2022 | Comprehensive Strategic Partnership |
| 2026 | ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation |
Static Dimensions
- ASEAN: founded in 1967 (Bangkok Declaration); principles of consensus, non-interference and ASEAN centrality. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (2019) aligns with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI, 2019).
- East Asia Summit: leaders-led forum created in 2005; the U.S. and Russia joined in 2011. Related ASEAN-led mechanisms: ADMM-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum.
- Trade: India runs a trade deficit with ASEAN, which is why the AITIGA review matters.
- Connectivity: India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Kaladan Multimodal Project and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation.
- Maritime doctrine: SAGAR/MAHASAGAR, UNCLOS (1982) and the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea.
Analysis
- Why the maritime focus works: it is low-friction and operational; exercises, fleet reviews and shared information centres build trust without alliance commitments.
- Economy is the weak link: political warmth has outpaced trade rules. Export growth driven by price-sensitive petroleum products may not last; concluding the AITIGA review with better rules of origin would help manufacturing exports and address misuse of preferences.
- Digital frontier: payment links, cables and start-up platforms extend India’s digital public infrastructure model, but need regulatory alignment on data and security.
- Strategic autonomy as a bridge: India’s ties across several camps match ASEAN’s own hedging, though being everywhere risks diluting focus.
- ASEAN centrality: reaffirming it fits the Philippines’ hosting and ASEAN’s concern about being sidelined by minilaterals.
- Caution: this is an advocacy-style view, and the summit outcomes are not yet known.
Challenges
- Incomplete AITIGA review and a persistent trade deficit.
- ASEAN’s internal diversity and consensus-based pace.
- Delayed connectivity projects in the North-East and Myanmar.
- Competing influence of other major powers.
- South China Sea disputes and Taiwan-related uncertainty.
Way Forward
- Conclude the AITIGA review with clear timelines and gains for MSMEs.
- Deepen maritime cooperation: HADR, cable protection, maritime domain awareness and capacity building.
- Operationalise digital links (UPI-Nexus), data governance and cybersecurity cooperation.
- Complete the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan projects.
- Expand education, tourism and skill exchanges.
- Align IPOI with ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook.
India Implications
- Indo-Pacific strategy: working with ASEAN, not around it, keeps India central to the regional order.
- Trade: a better AITIGA could cut the deficit and integrate Indian manufacturing into Southeast Asian supply chains.
- North-East development: Act East connectivity projects are key to the region’s economic future.
“India’s Act East Policy has moved from outreach to partnership, but the economic pillar remains unfinished.” Discuss. (15 Marks, 250 Words)
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