The Hindu
Important News Articles & Editorial Analysis
Daily Current Affairs · Raman Academy, Shimla
Goods exports jump 23% in September
India’s merchandise exports rose 23.04% in September 2026 to $44.4 billion, led by petroleum products, electronics and chemicals. The trade deficit narrowed to $30.21 billion from $33 billion a year earlier, mainly because gold and silver imports fell sharply. The figures show exports holding up amid global uncertainty and crude prices above $100 a barrel linked to the West Asia crisis — but the reasons behind the improvement matter as much as the improvement itself.
Key Analytical Dimensions
Petroleum product exports rose 31.9% to $6.2 billion, helped by high crude prices: when oil is expensive, refined exports are worth more even if volumes barely move. The same price works in the other direction on the import side, where crude imports rose 30.76% to $18.34 billion with Brent hovering above $100. Part of the headline export growth is therefore a value effect, not a volume effect.
Electronic goods exports jumped 70.44% to $5.3 billion, reflecting the PLI scheme and the China+1 manufacturing shift. The caveat is domestic value addition, which remains low: assembled exports carry a large share of imported components, so export value rises faster than the value India actually adds.
Gold imports fell 81.27% to $1.8 billion and silver imports fell 49.11% to $665 million. This, more than export strength alone, is what narrowed the monthly deficit. Precious-metal imports are volatile and respond to prices and seasonal demand, so the cushion is a one-off factor that may not persist.
For April–September 2026-27, exports rose 18.51% to $259.89 billion and imports 16.31% to $437.53 billion, so the deficit widened to $177.64 billion from $156.88 billion. Because imports are roughly 1.7 times exports, similar growth rates still widen the gap in dollars. Month on month, September’s deficit was also wider than August’s $26.86 billion.
Services exports were $36.35 billion against imports of $19.44 billion in September, a surplus of about $16.9 billion that offsets much of the goods deficit. But costlier oil has hurt services exports such as travel and tourism, which depend on affordable air travel.
Merchandise exports were $442 billion in 2025-26; the Commerce Secretary hopes they will cross $500 billion, and FIEO points to a $1 trillion export ambition. The Foreign Trade Policy 2023 targets $2 trillion in goods and services exports by 2030.
September 2026 Trade at a Glance
| Indicator | September 2026 | Change | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| Merchandise exports | $44.4 billion | +23.04% (from $36.08 billion) | Led by petroleum, electronics and chemicals |
| Merchandise imports | $74.61 billion | +8% | Held down by the fall in gold and silver |
| Trade deficit | $30.21 billion | Narrower than $33 billion | But wider than August’s $26.86 billion |
| Petroleum product exports | $6.2 billion | +31.9% | Price effect of crude above $100 |
| Electronic goods exports | $5.3 billion | +70.44% | PLI and China+1; value addition still low |
| Chemicals exports | $3 billion | +24.21% | Broadening of the export base |
| Gold imports | $1.8 billion | −81.27% | The main cushion for the deficit |
| Silver imports | $665 million | −49.11% | Adds to the precious-metal cushion |
| Crude oil imports | $18.34 billion | +30.76% | Vulnerability to West Asia tensions |
| Services | Exports $36.35 billion, imports $19.44 billion — a surplus of about $16.9 billion | ||
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| High crude prices and import dependence | Reduce oil dependence through ethanol blending, EVs, green hydrogen and strategic petroleum reserves |
| Global demand uncertainty and protectionism | Diversify export baskets and markets through FTAs |
| Low domestic value addition in electronics | Deepen component manufacturing and value addition |
| Rupee pressure and a widening current account deficit | Manage gold imports through gold monetisation and financial alternatives; strengthen services exports, including tourism, IT and global capability centres |
| Export concentration in a few products and markets | Export credit, logistics support and trade facilitation for MSMEs to widen the exporter base |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Balance of trade: Merchandise exports minus imports. The current account also includes services, remittances and income flows, which is why a large goods deficit can coexist with a moderate current account deficit.
- Data: Released monthly by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry around the 15th, based on data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S).
- Institutions: DGFT; the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO); Export Promotion Councils; the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation (ECGC); EXIM Bank.
- Policies: Foreign Trade Policy 2023 ($2 trillion goods and services exports by 2030); PLI schemes; RoDTEP (remission of embedded duties and taxes, designed to be WTO-compatible after the earlier MEIS was challenged); Districts as Export Hubs; the Export Promotion Mission.
- Trade agreements: India–UAE CEPA and the India–UK CETA; rules of origin and preferential tariffs; WTO rules on export subsidies and the Trade Facilitation Agreement.
- Gold: A major driver of India’s deficit; the Gold Monetisation Scheme and import-duty policy are the main levers.
- Related concepts: Terms of trade; India’s import dependence for crude oil (about 85%); the rupee exchange rate and its effect on export competitiveness.
India Implications
- The month’s improvement rests on two price effects and one one-off factor — dearer oil lifting petroleum exports, the same oil swelling imports, and a collapse in gold imports. A structurally strong external sector is one where exports grow on volume, value addition and diversification, which is the question the Mains practice question asks.
- Oil is the swing variable. With about 85% of crude imported, a sustained price spike widens the deficit, pressures the rupee and imports inflation — linking this story to yesterday’s wholesale inflation data.
- The services surplus and remittances are what keep India’s current account manageable. Protecting them — IT, global capability centres, tourism — is as much an external-sector policy as export promotion for goods.
- FTAs such as the UAE CEPA and the UK CETA open markets only if exporters actually use them, which depends on meeting rules of origin and on MSMEs having the information and finance to do so.
- HP AngleHimachal Pradesh sits inside these numbers in three ways. First, its manufactured exports are dominated by pharmaceuticals from the Baddi-Barotiwala-Nalagarh belt, so the state’s export performance depends on regulated-market approvals and on imported inputs priced in dollars — a weaker rupee helps the export price but raises the input bill. Second, the Districts as Export Hubs approach suits a state whose distinctive products are niche and GI-tagged: Kullu shawls, Kangra tea and the Chamba rumal need certification, branding and logistics support far more than large incentives. Third, the note that costlier oil hurts travel and tourism applies directly to a state whose service economy runs on tourists who arrive by road and air; high fuel prices raise both the cost of reaching Himachal and the cost of operating hotels and taxis once there. For an HPAS answer: Himachal’s external-sector stake is pharma exports and tourism receipts, and both are exposed to the same oil and currency shocks as the national figures.
Conclusion: Strong export growth is encouraging, but it is partly driven by high oil prices and one-off lower gold imports. Sustained progress towards the $500 billion goods target and the $1 trillion export ambition needs diversification, value addition and reduced energy dependence.
Q. Consider the following statements regarding Free Trade Agreements (FTAs):
- FTAs can reduce or eliminate tariffs on specified goods traded between partner countries.
- An FTA necessarily eliminates all non-tariff barriers.
- Rules of origin help determine whether goods qualify for preferential tariff treatment.
- An FTA guarantees that the trade balance will improve for every participating country.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 3 are correct. FTAs cut or remove tariffs on specified goods, and rules of origin decide whether a product has enough content from the partner country to qualify for the preferential rate — they stop third-country goods being routed through a partner. Statement 2 is wrong: FTAs may address some non-tariff barriers, but they do not necessarily eliminate them all. Statement 4 is wrong: an FTA changes market access, not outcomes, and a partner’s trade balance can worsen after an agreement if imports grow faster than exports — a concern India has raised about some of its earlier agreements.
Q. “High export growth alone does not guarantee a structurally strong external sector.” Critically examine.
10 Marks · 150 WordsShifting global focus towards an inclusive assessment of threats to health
The Lancet Commission on 21st Century Global Threats to Health, launched at the World Health Summit in Berlin, has listed 17 interlinked catastrophic threats that could shape global health through 2100 — among them pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, obesity, nuclear conflict and artificial intelligence. It urges leaders to stop treating these issues in isolation and to see them as connected economic, environmental and national-security challenges. It is not a forecast of unavoidable doom, but a guide to what policy can still change.
Key Analytical Dimensions
The Commission brings together 37 experts in health, economics, security and technology and uses a foresight-driven, health-focused approach. It measures threats in amenable DALYs from 2025 to 2100 — the burden that policy can reasonably alter — after analysing hundreds of risks across 204 countries and territories. A threat counts as “catastrophic” if it can account for at least 1 billion DALYs by 2100.
Two threats are placed in a category of their own for their extinction potential: nuclear conflict and the malicious use of AI. Their likelihood is low, but the harm would be immense — and harm of that kind cannot really be captured by a DALY count, which is why they are treated separately.
The single largest potential loss is obesity: tackling high BMI, poor diet and inactivity could avert 23.1 billion DALYs. Better access to education could avert 16.1 billion, and the amenable burden of income inequality equals 25 COVID-19 pandemics. The everyday, slow-moving risks outweigh the dramatic ones by a wide margin.
High-income countries will see losses mainly from non-communicable risks such as obesity and poor mental health; low-income regions will bear child malnutrition and the collapse of aid. Deep cuts to health aid could cause 1.5 billion DALYs, with sub-Saharan Africa bearing about 70%. Global health inequity widens along the same lines as income inequity.
Meeting climate targets would save an estimated 1.89 billion DALYs, which the Commission calls conservative. Climate change also worsens malnutrition, air pollution, AMR and mental health, which is the core of the systems view: threats amplify one another, so single-issue solutions fall short.
Critics note that it largely skirts the present geopolitical crisis, the rise of intolerant governments and weak international cooperation — the limited information flow on a suspected pneumonic plague death in Russia is cited as an example of the information-sharing problem. The report itself flags displacement, instability and drought as unmodelled “invisible” threats, and offers no fixed ranking.
The Commission’s Key Numbers
| Measure | Figure | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Threshold for “catastrophic” | At least 1 billion amenable DALYs by 2100 | Sets the bar for inclusion among the 17 threats |
| Obesity (high BMI, poor diet, inactivity) | 23.1 billion DALYs avertable | The largest single potential loss |
| Low educational attainment | 16.1 billion DALYs avertable | Education as a determinant of health |
| Income inequality | Equal to 25 COVID-19 pandemics | Inequality as a health risk in its own right |
| Cuts to development assistance for health | 1.5 billion DALYs | About 70% of the burden in sub-Saharan Africa |
| Meeting climate targets | 1.89 billion DALYs saved | A conservative estimate |
| Extinction-potential threats | Nuclear conflict and malicious use of AI — low likelihood, immense harm | |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Weak global cooperation and declining health aid | Sustain development assistance for health and reform global health financing |
| Siloed governance and budgeting for health | “Health in All Policies” and cross-sector planning across health, climate, education and security |
| Rising NCDs alongside persisting undernutrition | Regulate harmful products (tobacco, alcohol, unhealthy food); promote healthy diets and physical activity |
| Governance gaps for AI and nuclear risks | International norms on AI safety and nuclear risk reduction |
| Limited data on long-term, cascading risks | Early warning, foresight and regular updating of risk assessments; transparent information-sharing under the IHR |
| Underinvestment in primary healthcare | Strengthen primary healthcare and local health systems alongside climate action and pandemic preparedness |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- DALY: Years of Life Lost (YLL) plus Years Lived with Disability (YLD); one DALY is one lost year of healthy life.
- Global frameworks: WHO (Geneva); the International Health Regulations (2005); the WHO Pandemic Agreement negotiated after COVID-19; the Global Action Plan on AMR; the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2003); SDG 3 (health), SDG 4 (education), SDG 10 (inequality) and SDG 13 (climate).
- Indian context: National Health Mission; Ayushman Bharat (PM-JAY); the National Action Plan on AMR (NAP-AMR 2.0); the national NCD programme (formerly NPCDCS); Fit India; Eat Right India; the National Clean Air Programme.
- Constitutional links: Article 21 (right to health read into the right to life) and Article 47 (duty of the State to improve public health and nutrition).
- Concepts: One Health; Health in All Policies; syndemic (interacting epidemics that worsen each other); the epidemiological transition.
- Existential risk: Nuclear arms control — the NPT and the TPNW, neither of which India has joined; the global AI governance debate.
India Implications
- India faces the report’s threats simultaneously rather than in sequence — obesity, high blood pressure and other NCDs alongside persistent child malnutrition, air pollution, AMR and an ageing population. That is the textbook case for a systems approach rather than disease-by-disease programmes.
- The finding that education and income inequality are among the largest health threats means India’s health policy is made as much in its schools and labour markets as in its hospitals.
- On AMR, India’s high antibiotic use and pharmaceutical manufacturing base make it both a major risk and a major part of the solution; NAP-AMR 2.0 needs State action plans to bite.
- India’s voice on development assistance and Global South health financing matters, given that the burden of aid cuts falls on regions India engages through its own development partnerships.
- HP AngleSeveral of the Commission’s seventeen threats have a specific Himachal face. Unhealthy ageing comes first: Himachal has one of the oldest populations among Indian states, so long-term care, falls, dementia and chronic disease will press on a health system built around district hospitals and long travel times. Air pollution is not only a plains problem — the state’s National Clean Air Programme cities are its industrial foothill towns such as Baddi, Nalagarh, Kala Amb and Parwanoo. AMR has a manufacturing dimension, because pharmaceutical effluent in the BBN belt is a recognised route by which antibiotic residues enter rivers. Climate change reaches health through landslides, flash floods and disrupted access to care in the monsoon. And high alcohol use and poor mental health, together with the state’s drug-abuse problem, are among its most visible social health challenges. Schemes such as HIMCARE extend insurance, but the Commission’s point is that insurance pays for disease after it occurs. For an HPAS answer: in Himachal, health in all policies means road design, pharma effluent rules and elder care as much as hospital beds.
Conclusion: The Commission shifts the focus from single-disease thinking to a connected view of threats to human health and survival. Its value lies in showing that much of the future burden is avoidable through policy. Whether the world can turn this into coordinated action amid weakening multilateralism remains the real test.
Q. The concept of “amenable DALYs”, as used by the Lancet Commission on 21st Century Global Threats to Health, primarily seeks to measure:
Click to reveal answer
A DALY is one lost year of healthy life — years of life lost plus years lived with disability. The word “amenable” narrows it to the portion of that burden that policy can reasonably change, which is what makes the report action-oriented. Option A describes total DALYs without that filter; options C and D measure cost and mortality, neither of which is a DALY.
Q. “Global catastrophic health threats are interconnected and cannot be addressed through disease-specific interventions alone.” Discuss with suitable examples.
10 Marks · 150 Words‘Innovate today, nourish tomorrow’ for food security
The theme of World Food Day 2026 (16 October) is “Innovate today, nourish tomorrow”. The article notes that 645 million people still face hunger and about one-third of the world’s population cannot afford a healthy diet. India has moved from scarcity to surplus and now runs the world’s largest food safety net; the argument is that innovation, supported by the Rome-based agencies — FAO, IFAD and WFP — must now carry India beyond sufficiency towards better nutrition and equitable food systems.
Key Analytical Dimensions
The article names climate-related risks, economic shocks with food-price inflation, and conflict and civil strife. Each disrupts a different link in the chain — production, affordability and access — which is why hunger persists even in a world that produces enough calories.
The National Food Security Act, 2013 gives a legal entitlement to subsidised foodgrains for up to 75% of the rural and 50% of the urban population — about 81 crore people. Since January 2024 the grain has been free under PM Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana, extended until 2028. Delivery runs through the TPDS, digitised ration cards, Aadhaar seeding and One Nation One Ration Card for migrant workers.
FAO supports digital agriculture advisory road maps and training for extension workers, the Clean Milk Scorecard (a digital tool for dairy farmers), and work on food loss measurement and valorisation — turning losses into compost, bioenergy and recycled products.
IFAD focuses on the “first mile” of food systems with a “financing plus” approach. Every dollar it has invested in India has leveraged over three dollars in total investment; projects with strong private-sector participation show 64% income gains, four times higher than those without. It is now beginning direct lending to the private sector.
WFP, the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize winner, has worked in India for over 63 years. Its contributions include Grain ATMs, supply-chain optimisation and the Public Services Lab at IIT Delhi, along with work on improving the nutritional effectiveness of food assistance, including through millets.
A cereal-centric safety net solved the calorie problem; it has not solved dietary diversity or hidden hunger (micronutrient deficiency). The next phase needs pulses, millets, fruits, vegetables and biofortified crops — and an approach that is pro-smallholder and pro-woman, drawing on traditional knowledge alongside science.
The Four Pillars of Food Security
| Pillar | Meaning | India’s main instrument | Remaining gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability | Enough food produced, stored or imported | Green Revolution, MSP, FCI buffer stocks | Cereal-heavy output; climate risk to yields |
| Access | Economic and physical ability to obtain food | NFSA, PMGKAY, TPDS, ONORC | Healthy diets still unaffordable for many households |
| Utilisation | Nutritious, safe food that the body can absorb — depends on diet, water, sanitation and health | PM POSHAN, Poshan 2.0, fortification | Stunting, anaemia and hidden hunger |
| Stability | All three sustained over time and through shocks | Buffer stocks, price stabilisation, crop insurance | Price spikes and monsoon, climate and conflict shocks |
The Rome-Based Agencies in India
| Agency | Core role | India focus in the article |
|---|---|---|
| FAO (founded 1945) | Knowledge, standards and policy advice on food and agriculture | Digital advisory, Clean Milk Scorecard, food-loss measurement and valorisation |
| IFAD (founded 1977) | Finance for rural poverty reduction and smallholders | First-mile finance; crowding in private capital; direct private-sector lending |
| WFP (founded 1961) | Food assistance and logistics; Nobel Peace Prize 2020 | Grain ATMs, supply-chain optimisation, PDS efficiency, millets |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Climate change, erratic monsoons and falling yields | Scale digital advisory, precision and climate-resilient farming |
| Cereal-centric policy with persistent malnutrition and stunting | Diversify the PDS and scheme baskets with pulses, millets, fruits, vegetables and fortified or biofortified foods |
| Fragmented landholdings and weak first-mile finance | Strengthen FPOs, cold chains and storage; crowd in private and domestic capital for the first mile |
| Post-harvest losses and supply-chain gaps | Reduce food loss through valorisation and better logistics |
| Fiscal burden of the free-grain guarantee | PDS reform through technology, nutrition-sensitive baskets and last-mile delivery |
| Conflict-driven global shocks and trade disruptions | Empower women and smallholders; share India’s models with Global South partners through South–South cooperation |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- World Food Day: Observed on 16 October to mark the founding of the FAO in 1945; FAO, IFAD and WFP are the Rome-based agencies.
- Green Revolution (1960s): High-yielding varieties, irrigation and assured prices, associated with M.S. Swaminathan and Norman Borlaug, concentrated in Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh.
- Constitutional links: Article 21 — the right to food as part of the right to life (PUCL v. Union of India, 2001); Article 47 — duty to raise the level of nutrition.
- Schemes: PM POSHAN (mid-day meal); ICDS, Saksham Anganwadi and Poshan 2.0; Poshan Abhiyaan; Mission Millets and the International Year of Millets (2023).
- Institutions: FCI; the CACP and the MSP system; NAFED; ICAR.
- Global frameworks: SDG 2 (Zero Hunger); the Global Hunger Index; the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) report.
- Concepts: Biofortification; food loss (along the supply chain) against food waste (at retail and consumer level); hidden hunger.
India Implications
- India has turned production strength into a legal entitlement, which few countries have done at this scale. The policy question has moved from “is there enough grain?” to “is the diet adequate?”, and that requires a different set of instruments.
- The free-grain guarantee to 2028 is a large and recurring fiscal commitment; nutrition-sensitive baskets would get more nutritional value from the same expenditure than adding more cereal.
- Food loss reduction is a multiplier: it improves nutrition, farm incomes, resource use and climate outcomes at once, which makes cold chains and storage some of the highest-return investments available.
- India’s innovations under constraint — small holdings, monsoon dependence, linguistic diversity — are exportable models for the Global South, a soft-power asset in South–South cooperation.
- HP AngleHimachal is a useful test of the article’s shift from sufficiency to nutrition, because it took that step early. Alongside NFSA grain, the state has long run its own state-subsidised scheme supplying pulses, edible oil and salt through fair price shops — a nutrition-sensitive basket of exactly the kind the article recommends. The state’s farm economy has already diversified away from cereals into horticulture and off-season vegetables, and its uplands preserve traditional crops such as kodra and other millets in Chamba, Kinnaur and Mandi, which fit the millet push. Its natural farming programme, Prakritik Kheti Khushhal Kisan Yojana, is an attempt at the pro-smallholder, knowledge-based innovation the article describes. And food loss has a direct Himachal form: culled and surplus apples, which the Market Intervention Scheme and HPMC’s processing units turn into juice concentrate rather than waste — valorisation in practice. For an HPAS answer: Himachal shows that food security in a hill state is less about grain availability than about diversity, processing and cold chains.
Conclusion: India has secured food availability on a large scale and built a strong safety net. The next phase is about nutrition, climate resilience and equitable value chains that reward smallholders. By combining innovation, partnerships and inclusive delivery, India can nourish its own people and offer a workable blueprint for the wider world.
Q. With reference to the National Food Security Act, 2013, consider the following statements:
- It provides for coverage of up to 75% of the rural population and up to 50% of the urban population.
- The eldest woman of the household, not less than 18 years of age, is to be treated as the head of the household for issuing ration cards.
- Entitlements under the Act are limited to Antyodaya Anna Yojana households.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Statements 1 and 2 are correct. The coverage ceilings of 75% rural and 50% urban are in the Act, and it makes the eldest woman aged 18 or above the head of household for ration cards — a deliberate gender provision. Statement 3 is wrong: the Act covers both Antyodaya Anna Yojana households and priority households, which together make up roughly 81 crore beneficiaries.
Q. What are the four pillars of food security? Explain why food availability alone cannot ensure nutritional security.
10 Marks · 150 WordsThe debate over immunity to the CEC and ECs
On 13 October 2026, a Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana issued notice to the Centre and the Election Commission on a petition by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) challenging Section 16 of the CEC and EC Act, 2023. The provision gives current and former Chief Election Commissioners and Election Commissioners lifelong immunity from civil and criminal proceedings for acts done in the discharge of official duties. The petition has been tagged with a similar pending challenge by Lok Prahari. The issue tests the limits of immunity against equality before law and the rule of law.
Key Analytical Dimensions
Section 16 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 bars courts from entertaining or continuing any civil or criminal proceedings against a current or former CEC or EC for acts done or purported to be done in official duty. Three features make it unusual: it is lifelong, it covers both civil and criminal liability, and it has no good-faith condition or sanction mechanism.
The clause was not in the original Bill and has no rationale in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. It was added as an amendment on the day the Bill was passed in the Rajya Sabha, then cleared by the Lok Sabha and assented to in December 2023. The Law Minister said it would let the CEC and ECs work in an unhindered and independent manner. The 1991 Act it replaced had no such provision.
A law that treats one class differently must rest on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to its objective. Other independent authorities — the CAG, PSC members, the Lokpal and Lokayuktas, Information Commissioners — function without lifelong, unconditional immunity, which weakens the claim that the Election Commission needs it. And extending protection to acts “purported” to be official could shield even misuse of power, raising the arbitrariness test of E.P. Royappa.
The Government argues that insulating the Commission from vexatious litigation protects its independence. Election officials take contested decisions in charged political settings, and the threat of personal suits could chill them. The real question is degree: protection can be narrowed to good-faith acts and filtered through prior sanction without becoming a blanket bar.
A late amendment adopted without committee scrutiny or stated reasons weakens legislative deliberation — ADR argues there was no debate on it in the Rajya Sabha and that motions to refer the Bill to a Select Committee were defeated. How a provision is enacted does not by itself decide its validity, but it bears on the question of whether the classification was reasoned.
In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) a Constitution Bench directed a selection panel of the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and Chief Justice of India until Parliament legislated. The 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister. Read together, an executive-majority selection panel and lifelong immunity reduce accountability and public confidence in the body that oversees elections.
Immunities Compared
| Office | Source | What is protected | Limits |
|---|---|---|---|
| CEC and ECs | Section 16, CEC and EC Act, 2023 | Civil and criminal proceedings for acts done or purported to be done in official duty | None stated — lifelong, with no good-faith test or sanction route |
| President and Governors | Article 361 | Not answerable to any court for official acts; no criminal proceedings or arrest during the term | Proceedings against the Government remain open; civil suits on personal acts allowed after two months’ notice |
| MPs and MLAs | Articles 105 and 194 | Speech and votes in the House and its committees | Confined to House proceedings; no protection for bribery (Sita Soren, 2024) |
| Judges | Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 | Acts and words in the discharge of judicial duty | The Government and superior courts may still proceed against a judge |
| Diplomats | Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 | Immunity from the host State’s jurisdiction | Based on functional necessity and reciprocity; can be waived by the sending State |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Balancing independence with accountability | Remove or narrow Section 16, with immunity only for acts done in good faith |
| Preventing frivolous litigation without a blanket bar | Procedural safeguards instead, such as prior sanction or screening of complaints |
| Arbitrary differences between constitutional functionaries | Align protections with those of judges and other constitutional functionaries |
| Limited scrutiny of last-minute amendments | Detailed parliamentary debate and committee scrutiny of such amendments |
| Executive influence over appointments | Strengthen independent appointment and removal mechanisms for the Election Commission |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Article 14: Equality before law (the British concept, from Dicey’s rule of law) and equal protection of the laws (the American concept); part of the basic structure.
- Reasonable classification: Intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the objective (State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952); arbitrariness as a violation of equality (E.P. Royappa, 1974).
- Article 324: The Election Commission’s superintendence, direction and control of elections. Article 324(5): the CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge; ECs only on the CEC’s recommendation.
- Article 361: Immunity of the President and Governors (Rameshwar Prasad, 2006).
- Parliamentary privileges: Articles 105 and 194; not codified so far.
- Basic structure: Free and fair elections, rule of law and judicial review (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973; Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975).
- Related laws: Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951; the 1991 Act on the conditions of service of Election Commissioners, replaced by the 2023 Act.
India Implications
- The case is about a general principle: independence and accountability are complements, not substitutes. Independence protects a body from interference in its decisions; it does not require that the individuals running it be beyond the reach of law.
- Trust in the Election Commission is a public good in its own right. A body that oversees elections depends on being seen to be accountable, which is why a blanket bar can damage the very independence it is meant to protect.
- The comparison with other functionaries is the strongest Mains point: the Constitution trusts judges, the CAG and the President with limited, conditioned protection. Whether a statute can give more to the Commission than the Constitution gives to the President is the question the Court will have to answer.
- The case also tests legislative process: amendments that create significant rights or immunities deserve committee scrutiny, whichever way the substantive question is decided.
- HP AngleTwo Himachal facts sharpen the comparison. First, the state has its own constitutional election authority — the HP State Election Commission under Article 243K, which conducts panchayat and urban local body polls. The State Election Commissioner can be removed only in the manner and on the grounds of a High Court judge, which gives real security of tenure, yet there is no statutory lifelong immunity for that office — and local elections in Himachal’s panchayats have run without one. Second, Section 16 protects only the three members of the Election Commission. The officers who actually conduct parliamentary and assembly polls in Himachal — the Chief Electoral Officer, District Election Officers and Returning Officers, working across remote polling stations in Kinnaur, Lahaul-Spiti and Chamba — take the ground-level decisions and enjoy no such protection. For an HPAS answer: if the people doing the hardest election work function without lifelong immunity, the case that the Commission’s members need it is weaker.
Conclusion: Independence of the Election Commission is vital for free and fair elections, but independence cannot mean absolute immunity. A narrowly tailored, good-faith protection with procedural safeguards would preserve both autonomy and accountability, consistent with Article 14 and the rule of law.
Q. Which of the following statements best describes Article 361 of the Constitution of India?
Click to reveal answer
Article 361 protects only the President and Governors: they are not answerable to any court for official acts, no criminal proceedings can be instituted against them during their term, and civil suits for personal acts need two months’ notice. Option A is wrong because the Article covers no other authority. Option C is wrong because the legality of the action itself remains reviewable — in Rameshwar Prasad (2006) the Court examined a Governor’s dissolution report while upholding his personal immunity. Option D confuses Article 361 with legislative privilege under Articles 105 and 194.
Q. Explain the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution. How does the doctrine of reasonable classification help determine the constitutional validity of a law?
10 Marks · 150 WordsAdvancing the women-led development model
The National Commission for Women (NCW) held a consultation on women’s right to property and their access to social and economic justice. The article asks why women have not been empowered so far, and argues that empowerment has been confined to welfare schemes, reservation and protection against discrimination. It calls for a shift from compensatory to distributive justice, and from “women-based” to “women-led” development, which it treats as essential for Viksit Bharat@2047.
Key Analytical Dimensions
Compensatory justice repairs harm after it occurs — welfare, reservation and protective laws; the article cites Articles 17 and 23 and Section 396 of the BNSS (victim compensation). Distributive justice allocates resources fairly in the first place so that compensation is needed less. It is rooted in Articles 38, 39 and 46, and the article argues the Constitution gives it precedence.
In Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union (1996) the Court read the Preamble and Articles 38, 39 and 46 as aiming at an egalitarian social order. In Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India (1995) it held that socio-economic and distributive justice are part of Article 21.
Article 300-A protects property equally for men and women. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 gave daughters equal coparcenary rights, and in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) the Court held that a daughter is a coparcener by birth, regardless of whether her father was alive in 2005. The gap is not in the statute book.
The barriers are a patriarchal mindset, a social fabric that does not support women’s claims, low legal awareness and limited access to justice. Strong statutes and judgments exist, yet women seldom claim inherited property — often giving up their share under family pressure — which is an implementation and mindset gap rather than a legal one.
Ownership strengthens a woman’s social status, bargaining power and decision-making within the household, and gives her collateral for credit. Treating empowerment as a right rather than a welfare measure changes women from beneficiaries into claimants.
Gender-sensitive property records through digitisation, simplified mutation and automatic recording of women’s shares; legal literacy campaigns through Self-Help Groups with free legal aid; and leadership roles for women who have excelled, so that they act as drivers of change and visible role models.
Compensatory and Distributive Justice Compared
| Feature | Compensatory justice | Distributive justice |
|---|---|---|
| Logic | Repair or offset harm after it occurs | Allocate resources fairly so that harm is prevented |
| Constitutional anchors | Articles 15(3), 17 and 23; victim compensation under Section 396 BNSS | The Preamble; Articles 38, 39 and 46 |
| Instruments | Welfare schemes, reservation, protective laws | Property and inheritance rights, land titles, credit, equal pay |
| Woman’s position | Beneficiary | Claimant and decision-maker |
| Development model | Women-based | Women-led |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| Deep-rooted patriarchal attitudes and social norms | Change attitudes through education and community engagement |
| Low land ownership by women, especially in agriculture | Digitise land and inheritance records with automatic entry of women’s shares |
| Weak legal awareness and difficult access to courts | Legal literacy campaigns through SHGs and Panchayats, backed by NALSA and DLSAs |
| Gaps in record-keeping and mutation | Strengthen the NCW and State commissions with enforcement support |
| Low female labour force participation and limited credit | Credit, skilling and market access for women entrepreneurs |
| Gaps between the personal laws of different communities | Promote women’s leadership in institutions, Panchayats and corporate boards to drive reform |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- NCW: A statutory body under the National Commission for Women Act, 1990, set up in 1992; it reviews legal safeguards for women.
- Equality provisions: Articles 14, 15(3) and 16; Article 39(a), (d) and (e) — adequate means of livelihood, equal pay for equal work, protection of workers’ health; Article 42 — just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief; Article 51A(e) — duty to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.
- Political representation: Articles 243D and 243T — one-third reservation for women in Panchayats and Municipalities; the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam, 2023 — one-third reservation in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies.
- Right to property: A constitutional right under Article 300-A since the 44th Amendment (1978), no longer a fundamental right.
- Related laws: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937; Indian Succession Act, 1925; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
- Schemes: Beti Bachao Beti Padhao; Mahila Shakti Kendra; Lakhpati Didi; DAY-NRLM (SHGs); Stand-Up India; SVAMITVA (property cards).
- Concepts and global frameworks: Substantive equality; gender justice; feminisation of agriculture; the Gender Inequality Index; CEDAW (1979); SDG 5.
India Implications
- The compensatory-distributive distinction gives a clear Mains frame: welfare and reservation treat the symptoms of exclusion, while property, credit and inheritance change the distribution that produces it.
- Land records are the lever. If mutation automatically records a daughter’s share, the burden of claiming shifts from the woman to the State — a small administrative change with large distributive effects.
- With women doing a growing share of farm work, the feminisation of agriculture without women’s land ownership leaves farm women outside credit, insurance and scheme benefits that are tied to titles.
- Viksit Bharat@2047 depends on raising female labour force participation; ownership of productive assets is one of the most direct ways to do so.
- HP AngleHimachal shows both halves of this argument with unusual clarity. On one side, the state has among the highest female labour force participation rates in India, and in its hill districts women carry much of the farm and orchard work while many men are in service jobs or the armed forces — a lived example of the feminisation of agriculture, usually on land recorded in men’s names. On the other, the state’s tribal districts illustrate the gap between personal laws that the article flags: Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act excludes Scheduled Tribes unless the Centre notifies otherwise, so in Kinnaur and Lahaul-Spiti inheritance has largely followed customary law under which daughters do not inherit ancestral land. Kinnauri women’s groups have campaigned against this for decades, and in 2022 the Supreme Court asked the Centre to consider amending the Act on this point. For an HPAS answer: in Himachal, women-led development means turning the women who already run the farm into the women who own it — and resolving the tribal inheritance question is the hardest part of that.
Conclusion: Legal protection of women’s property rights is in place, but social attitudes and weak institutions limit their use. Moving from welfare to rights, and from women-based to women-led development, can make growth inclusive and sustainable on the road to Viksit Bharat@2047.
Q. With reference to women’s property rights in India, consider the following statements:
- The right to property is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution.
- Under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, a daughter becomes a coparcener by birth in the same manner as a son.
- In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020), the Supreme Court held that a daughter’s coparcenary right depends on her father being alive when the 2005 amendment came into force.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Click to reveal answer
Only statement 2 is correct. Statement 1 is wrong: the 44th Amendment (1978) removed the right to property from Part III, and it now survives as a constitutional right under Article 300-A. Statement 3 reverses the holding — Vineeta Sharma held that the daughter’s right arises by birth, so it does not depend on whether the father was alive on the date the amendment took effect.
Q. Distinguish between compensatory justice and distributive justice in the context of women’s empowerment.
10 Marks · 150 WordsA contested UNSC seat poses a test for India
Context
India has launched a bid for a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for the 2028-29 term, with voting in the UN General Assembly in June 2027. Unlike earlier occasions, India faces a contest, because Tajikistan was already in the fray and was to be the Asia-Pacific Group’s consensus choice. The editorial sets out three options — fight the election, persuade Tajikistan to withdraw, or step aside — and suggests that a battle with a smaller, friendly country may be better avoided in the larger fight for permanent membership.
Key Analytical Dimensions
Election requires a two-thirds majority of members present and voting — at least 129 votes if all 193 members vote. India’s campaign is already under way: during the September session of the 81st UNGA, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar held nearly 90 meetings in 10 days in New York.
India has served eight terms, and the 2028-29 bid would be its ninth. Its recent wins came with full Asia-Pacific backing: 187 of 191 votes in 2010 and 184 of 192 in 2020, after Kazakhstan (2010) and Afghanistan (2013) withdrew in its favour. India has lost the only two contested elections it fought — 1975 against Pakistan and 1996 against Japan.
Tajikistan has the backing of Central Asia and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (57 members), and its pitch — to listen to all voices, large and small — is aimed squarely at smaller States. India is confident of the Global North, ASEAN, CARICOM and the Pacific island states, but the battleground is the Global South.
The June 2026 elections showed it plainly: Kyrgyzstan beat the Philippines (142 votes to 49) for the Asia-Pacific seat, Portugal and Austria beat Germany in the Western European contest, and Bangladesh’s Khalilur Rahman defeated Cyprus’s candidate for the presidency of the UNGA. Frequency counts against frequent members when smaller States push for a first opportunity.
India’s ties with Israel, including Prime Minister Modi’s February 2026 visit, may draw questions from States sympathetic to Palestine, though India’s strategic autonomy helps. The relationship with Tajikistan matters too: it hosted an Indian Air Force presence at Ayni and an Indian medical facility at Farkhor.
The editorial’s central framing: winning a costly election against a friendly, smaller State could cost more goodwill than the seat is worth, while persuading Tajikistan to withdraw could signal that India puts its ninth term above a smaller country’s first. A tactical step back could win goodwill and a clear path later. Japan, with 12 terms, offers a contrast: it has already declared candidatures for 2032 and 2043.
The Three Options
| Option | Possible gain | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Fight the election | A ninth term and a visible test of support | A Pyrrhic win or an outright loss against a smaller friendly State; a split in the Asia-Pacific Group and the Global South |
| Persuade Tajikistan to withdraw | A clean path, as in 2010 and 2013 | The appearance of a large State crowding out a smaller one |
| Step aside | Goodwill in the Global South and a clearer path later; consistency with the permanent-seat narrative | Two years without a seat at the table |
| Compromise | A split term or an agreed sequence of candidatures | Requires both sides to accept less than a full two-year term |
India’s Record in UNSC Elections
| Election | Circumstance | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 1975 | Contested | Lost to Pakistan |
| 1996 | Contested | Lost to Japan |
| 2010 (term 2011–12) | Kazakhstan withdrew; full Asia-Pacific backing | Won with 187 of 191 votes |
| 2020 (term 2021–22) | Afghanistan had withdrawn in 2013; full Asia-Pacific backing | Won with 184 of 192 votes |
| 2027 (term 2028–29) | Tajikistan already in the fray; no consensus | A contest, unless one side steps aside |
| Terms served | 1950–51, 1967–68, 1972–73, 1977–78, 1984–85, 1991–92, 2011–12 and 2021–22 | |
Challenges and the Way Forward
| Challenge | Way forward |
|---|---|
| A two-thirds threshold in a contested election | Intensify bilateral outreach in Africa, Latin America and the Pacific, building on the Global South platform |
| Tajikistan’s strong regional and OIC support | Continue quiet diplomacy with Tajikistan; consider a split term or an agreed sequence |
| Resentment of permanent-seat aspirants among some Global South States | Present a clear Global South agenda on terrorism, climate, UN reform and peacekeeping; use development partnerships and capacity-building |
| Questions over ties with Israel and India’s West Asia position | Balance West Asia ties with consistent positions on Palestine and a two-state solution |
| Stalled UNSC reform, leaving elected seats as the only route to the table | Keep pushing reform through the G4 and the Intergovernmental Negotiations; leverage the diaspora |
Static Dimensions to Revise
- Composition: 15 members — five permanent (P5: US, UK, France, Russia, China) with the veto, and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms, five each year.
- Seat distribution (non-permanent): Africa 3, Asia-Pacific 2, Latin America and the Caribbean 2, Western European and Others 2, Eastern Europe 1.
- Election: By the UNGA, requiring a two-thirds majority of members present and voting; held in June for terms beginning the following January.
- UN Charter: Chapter V (Articles 23–32) covers the Security Council; Article 24 gives it primary responsibility for international peace and security.
- Reform groups: The G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan); Uniting for Consensus (the “Coffee Club”); the L.69 group; the African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus; the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN).
- India at the UNSC: The 2021–22 tenure prioritised counter-terrorism, maritime security and peacekeeping; India held the presidency in August 2021. India is among the largest troop contributors to UN peacekeeping.
- Related groupings and concepts: NAM, G77, SCO, BRICS, OIC; strategic autonomy; Global South leadership and the Voice of the Global South Summit.
India Implications
- India’s UN record shows that regional consensus has been its real electoral asset. Without it, the bloc arithmetic of the Global South — Central Asia, the OIC, Africa — becomes decisive, and India has lost both contests of that kind.
- There is a tension between frequency and the permanent-seat claim. Every additional elected term strengthens India’s case that it belongs at the table, but it also feeds the argument of smaller States that big powers already have more than their share of turns.
- India’s claim to lead the Global South is being tested in the most concrete way possible: will the Global South vote for it? How India handles a smaller, friendly rival will be read as evidence either way.
- West Asia positions now carry electoral weight. Consistency on Palestine and the two-state solution is not only a principle but a factor in OIC votes.
- HP AngleIndia’s most concrete credential at the UN — that it is among the largest contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping — has a strong Himachal component. The state contributes soldiers to the armed forces far out of proportion to its population, with traditional recruitment areas in Kangra, Hamirpur, Mandi and Bilaspur, and Himachali personnel have served in peacekeeping missions from Africa to Lebanon. When India argues for a seat on the strength of what it has given to the UN’s peace operations, much of that service has been rendered by families in Himachal’s villages. The state also borders the Tibet Autonomous Region, a reminder that the P5 member most opposed to India’s permanent-seat ambition is its neighbour on the Kinnaur and Lahaul-Spiti frontier. For an HPAS answer: India’s UN case rests on peacekeeping service, and Himachal is one of the places that service comes from.
Conclusion: India’s bid for a ninth term tests its diplomacy, its standing in the Global South and its priorities. The choice is between winning a costly election against a friendly, smaller State and a tactical step back that could strengthen its long-term claim. Whatever route is chosen, India must show that its aspiration for UNSC leadership rests on the trust of developing countries.
Q. “India’s pursuit of a non-permanent UNSC seat must be evaluated in the context of its long-term demand for permanent membership.” Discuss.
15 Marks · 250 WordsQ. Examine the role of regional group consensus in elections to the non-permanent seats of the UN Security Council, with reference to India’s candidature for the 2028–29 term.
10 Marks · 150 Words